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ABSTRACT 
 Interest in non-monetary incentives (NMIs) as a 
retention tool in the military services is increasing; 
however, prior research indicates that providing the same 
NMIs to all retainees is an expensive and inefficient 
approach. This research used an experimental methodology to 
investigate the use of auction mechanisms that create 
individualized retention bonuses combining both monetary 
and non-monetary incentives. Specifically, the experiment 
examined individuals’ behavior patterns in using these 
auction mechanisms while including NMIs with independent 
and combinatorial qualities (complements and substitutes). 
Prior research with NMIs has assumed an additive 
relationship; however, this is often not the case. 
Hypotheses suggested that experimental subjects would 
choose NMI combinations that maximize their personal 
compensation value and then appropriately adjust their bid 
to the optimal level. The experimental results of the study 
support the hypotheses. In all auction formats, individuals 
appropriately selected the optimal NMI combinations 70 
percent of the time. Those choices that were considered 
complex were still chosen correctly 66 percent of the time, 
suggesting individuals do behave rationally when dealing 
with various combinations of NMIs. These results provide 
support for the practical use of such auction mechanisms 
for incorporating NMIs in the retention process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program has 
proven itself to be a very influential tool.  For example, 
the United States Marine Corps has used the SRB to shape 
manpower needs for many years, most recently with the 
202,000 authorized end-strength increase.1  However, the 
program has become increasingly expensive to employ and the 
current program design has significant weaknesses. 
This research further investigated the use of auctions 
as force-shaping and force-management tools for military 
manpower needs.  Specifically, the following research 
investigated the use of uniform-price and discriminatory-
price auction mechanisms that incorporated monetary and 
non-monetary incentives (NMIs) to influence retention among 
military service members.  An experiment was designed, 
conducted, and analyzed to see how individuals behave when 
choosing from NMI options with either independent or 
combinatorial valuations and how these NMIs choices 
influenced monetary bidding behavior. 
B. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
In an all-voluntary force, military services attempt 
to maintain authorized end-strengths by influencing and 
adjusting accessions and retention through compensation and 
incentives.  With the exception of the current economic 
                     
1 B. J. Swenson, “Manpower Increase Leads to $10,000 Re-enlistment 
Incentive,” Marine Forces Reserve, (February 2007), 
http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/mfrnews/2007/2007.02/AIP.asp (accessed: 
26 February 2010). 
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downturn,2 maintaining required manpower in the United 
States (U.S.) military has become more challenging and 
expensive.  Once the economy begins to realize positive 
growth, we can expect to see familiar manpower challenges 
reappear.   
To fill shortages in Military Occupational Specialties 
(MOSs) characterized by inadequate manning, low retention, 
and high replacement costs, the current practice is to 
provide SRBs in the form of pure monetary compensation.3  
The SRB is less like a bonus and more of a wage 
differential provided to specific individuals whose skills 
are in high demand.4  The reenlistment bonus program has 
become increasingly expensive and has received more 
attention because of dramatic spending increases.  Factors 
that influence the SRB budget include a war on two fronts, 
strategic planning changes, and economic factors.  Overall, 
the data suggests that it is becoming more expensive to 
retain specially qualified military personnel via the 
current SRB program. 
There are well-known problems with the current SRB 
program, such as selecting which occupational specialties 
                     
2 Otto Kreisher, “Recession Helps Military Recruiters Reach 36-year 
High,” National Journal, (October 2009), 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/cda_20091014_5927.php 
(accessed: 23 October 2009).  
3 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010 Budget Estimates Submission, Justification of Estimates, May 
2009, Military Personnel, Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008), 57. 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/10pres/MPMC_Justification_Book.pdf 
(accessed: 19 January 2010). 
4 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics,” (Lecture, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, January 15, 2009).   
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to include in the SRB program,5 precision in selecting the 
right amount of required reenlistments, and the cost-
effectiveness of paying high economic rent based on 
estimated bonus amounts.6  This research sought to provide 
more knowledge in ways to resolve the last two problems, 
precision and cost-effectiveness.  The use of auction 
theory combined with experimental economics provides a 
theoretical framework showing the potential advantages of 
using a reenlistment bonus program based on an auction 
mechanism combining monetary bonuses with NMIs.  The 
experiment is designed using the Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism (CRAM), which is a tool that efficiently 
selects the least-cost individuals to meet end-strength 
goals through an auction incorporating individualized 
combinations of NMIs. 
The research used the CRAM and further investigated 
how individuals select various combinations of NMIs. 
Specifically, an experiment sought to determine the effects 
of NMIs with independent and/or combinatorial values while 
using uniform-price and discriminatory-price auction 
mechanisms.  The ultimate goal is to implement a new 
reenlistment retention system that can better match the 
supply and demand of military manpower while saving 
government resources. 
                     
5 U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO Highlights, Military Personnel: 
Management and Oversight of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program 
Needs Improvement, Report, GAO-03-149 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2002), 1. 
6 Peter J. Coughlan and William R. Gates, “Auction Mechanisms For 
Force Management,” in Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply about 
Diversity in the US Armed Forces, ed. James E. Parco and David A. Levy 
(Alabama: Air University Press, 2010), 507-519. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research addressed the following questions: 
1. Primary Question 
Do individuals understand and make reasonable 
decisions using the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism in simulated retention scenarios? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. Do individuals make rational decisions when faced 
with numerous NMI choices? 
b. Do individuals select the optimal NMI combination 
when faced with a complex choice due to combinatorial 
values? 
c. When facing discriminatory-price and uniform-
price auctions, do individuals appropriately adjust their 
bid to the optimal value for the particular auction format?  
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis includes a basic review of U.S. military 
compensation and the current SRB program.  It also reviews 
prior research concerning auction theory, the CRAM, and 
economic experiments.  An experiment conducted provides the 
background and necessary data to answer the research 
questions.  This study primarily focused on improving the SRB 
program, while the theories discussed can likely be applied 
to other force-shaping/force-management tools.  This thesis 
used NMIs in a notional sense and does not investigate 
specific NMIs, such as sabbaticals.  
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E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is both qualitative and quantitative in 
nature.  The focus is on further exploring different 
aspects of the CRAM as a reenlistment tool by reviewing 
prior research.  A series of laboratory experiments 
investigated the use of independent and combinatorial NMIs 
with uniform and discriminatory auction mechanisms. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This research is a continuation of an on-going 
investigation by Dr. Peter Coughlan and Dr. William Gates 
into the cost-effectiveness of offering monetary and non-
monetary reenlistment retention packages, or flexible 
benefits packages, to military personnel.  Much of the 
thesis builds on this prior research. 
Chapter II provides an overview of military 
compensation and current force-shaping/force-management 
tools.  The SRB program is discussed in-depth, explaining 
how it functions today.  The chapter concludes by 
identifying weakness with the current program. 
Chapter III introduces auction mechanisms and the key 
benefits of the CRAM.  The “total rewards” concept combines 
monetary bonuses and NMIs into the auction process.  Issues 
raised about NMIs, such as super/sub-additive valuations, 
provide the justification for an experiment. 
Chapter IV explains economic experiments including 
design issues.  Experiments are an excellent resource in 
order to determine potential effects of policy or program 
changes. 
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Chapter V discusses the specific experiment conducted, 
its design, and expected results.  Chapter IV and VII 
presents the results of the experiment and provides 
conclusions and recommendations. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
An all-volunteer military force requires continuous 
monitoring.  The current SRB program has significant 
weaknesses, and prior research has identified potential 
ways to fix the problems.  This research is designed to 
shed more light on the use of auctions and NMIs as a 
reenlistment tool for the military services. 
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II. MILITARY COMPENSATION 
“There is room for innovative change in the 
compensation system.”7 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter reviews the basics of military 
compensation and the tools used to shape and manage the 
force.  Emphasis is placed on the SRB program and how it 
functions.  The chapter concludes with the two main 
weaknesses of the current SRB program, and leads into 
Chapter III, which discusses ways to fix the weakness with 
an auction mechanism. 
B. OVERVIEW MILITARY COMPENSATION 
People join the military for a myriad of reasons; 
aside from propensity to service, one of the most important 
factors influencing enlistment and reenlistment decisions 
is the compensation.  In 1973, the United States (U.S.) 
switched to an all-voluntary military force, making pay a 
critical component of balancing the supply and demand of 
qualified military labor.   
Without adequate compensation, the nation would 
be unable to sustain the all-volunteer force, in 
the size and with the skill set needed, to 
support the missions called for in the national 
security strategy.8 
                     
7 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, 
vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2008), 
xxii. 
8 Ibid., xiii. 
 8
On a basic level, the primary purpose of military 
compensation is to support defense manpower policies that 
in turn support the nation’s defense strategy.9  More 
specifically, military compensation is used to: 
1. Attract people into the services in the right 
numbers and with the quality required; 
2. Retain in service those who are needed to meet 
the skill, grade, and experience requirements to 
fill vacancies; 
3. Separate those who are no longer needed.10    
The compensation system is complex, involving a mix of 
basic pay, allowances, monetary and non-monetary benefits, 
deferred benefits, special pays, and bonuses.   
1. Basic Pay and Allowances 
Basic pay makes up 60 percent of a service member’s 
total compensation.11  The basic pay is rigid and determined 
by rank and years of service, not by MOS or assignment.  As 
individuals gain rank and/or experience, their pay 
increases.   
Allowances include Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) 
and Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), which vary by 
location, family status, or officer/enlisted status.  Basic 
pay and basic allowances do not allow for leaders to reward  
 
                     
9 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation, vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 9. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Ibid., 19. 
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deserving individuals; however, leaders may reprimand by 
withholding pay or reducing rank (which reduces pay and 
allowances as well). 
2. Other Monetary and Non-Monetary Benefits 
One of the largest monetary benefits provided to 
service members is the tax advantage gained by having BAH 
and BAS excluded from federal and state income taxes.  This 
compensation varies by individuals, but it accounts for 
roughly 6 percent of total compensation.12 
Non-monetary benefits generally include health care, 
education programs, annual leave, commissaries, exchanges, 
fitness facilities, and other Morale, Welfare, and 
Recreation facilities.  There are many more non-monetary 
benefits and, since the incentive is not purely “cash,” 
everyone places a different value on the benefit.  Despite 
these different preferences, however, such non-monetary 
benefits are provided to all service members, regardless of 
how much they actually value the benefit (even if they 
value the benefit significant less than it costs to provide 
it to them).  The Department of Defense has also shown 
interest in providing NMIs, such as sabbaticals, to 
influence retention decisions.13 
                     
12 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation, vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 21. 
13 Rick Maze, “DoD plan would allow sabbaticals up to 3 years,” Navy 
Times, (April 2008), 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/03/army_sabbatical_033108w/ 
(accessed: 18 February 2010). 
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3. Deferred Benefits 
Major deferred benefits are retirement payments and 
health care support provided to retired military personnel.  
While these benefits are not paid to active duty service 
members, they are considered when discussing military 
compensation.  However, statistics show that less than 15 
percent of the enlisted force and less than 47 percent of 
the officer force will become eligible for the retirement 
benefits.14   
4. Special Pays and Bonuses 
Special and incentive pays, including bonuses, are 
used to address staffing shortfalls in specific 
occupational areas, compensate members for hazardous or 
otherwise less-desirable duty assignments, and encourage 
attainment and retention of valuable skills.15  Bonuses in 
the U.S. Military have a long history dating back to the 
creation of the continental army.16  This type of pay is 
based on geographic location, MOS, or other circumstances. 
Bonuses can be put into two groups, extended and 
immediate force shaping/management tools.  Examples of 
extended tools include aviation pay, family separation pay, 
and hazardous duty pay; these are paid monthly to 
individuals who qualify for them.  Immediate tools are used 
to meet immediate needs and are designed either to increase 
                     
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation, vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 22. 
15 Ibid., 20. 
16 Reading Eagle, “Coats Given to Army,” Reading Pennsylvania, 29 
June 1975, 55. 
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retention or promote voluntary separation to meet end-
strength requirements.  An example of an immediate tool is 
the SRB program, in which qualified individuals in a 
specific MOS receive a monetary incentive when agreeing to 
serve for an additional time period.  The following section 
will provide additional context concerning the SRB program. 
C. THE SRB PROGRAM (MARINE CORPS) 
The use of reenlistment bonuses can be dated back at 
least to 1920, when reenlisted service members would 
receive bonuses between $126 and $252, based on 
experience.17  Every major U.S. war during the past century 
has resulted in paying service members reenlistment 
bonuses.  A cost-benefit analysis is conducted for each 
occupational specialty to determine if it is cheaper to 
recruit and train individuals or retain individuals who 
have experience.  It is a delicate balance to maintain the 
right mix of accessions and retentions.  
Over the years, the program has had different names, 
such as the Regular Reenlistment Bonus and the Variable 
Reenlistment Bonus.  In 1965, it was renamed the Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus program.  Over the years, the SRB has 
become the primary tool for affecting reenlistment rates, 
due to its flexibility, effectiveness, and option to be 
suspended when not needed.  Additionally, the SRB can 
specifically target the two areas that are at risk of 
shortages: those technical jobs where members have skills  
 
                     
17 The Delmarvia Star, “11 Young Men Here Enlist In Navy: Local 
Recruiting Office Finds Attractive Assignments For Them,” Wilmington 
Delaware, 19 September 1920, 10.  
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highly valued in the civilian economy and therefore have 
better civilian alternatives, and those jobs that are 
arduous.18  
The Marine Corps Order on SRBs states that: 
The SRB program was established to assist in 
attaining and sustaining adequate numbers of 
career enlisted personnel in designate MOSs and 
within particular years-of-service groupings. The 
program provides a monetary incentive for a 
reenlistment of at least four years at three 
career decision points during the first 14 years 
of service. Marine Corps Bulletin 7220 series, 
published separately and revised as required to 
meet the needs of the Marine Corps, identify MOSs 
eligible for a SRB and their multiples. The 
intent of this program is that Marines who 
receive a bonus for reenlistment in a particular 
skill serve the entire period of reenlistment in 
that skill.19 
Not all service members are eligible; the SRB is 
designed to target specific individuals based on MOS and 
years-of-service.  The bulletin referenced in the Marine 
Corps Order is usually issued annually, and lists the MOSs 
along with years-of-service zones that are available for 
the bonus.  The SRB multiple amounts are determined by the 
Marine Corps with assistance from the Center for Naval 
Analysis (CNA).  CNA uses regression analysis to predict 
reenlistments by MOS as a function of the SRB amount.20 
                     
18 Anita U. Hattiangadi et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum 
Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C Reenlistments: Final Report, 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2004), 9. 
19 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 7220.24M: Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps, 1990), 1-2. 
20 Anita U. Hattiangadi et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum 
Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C Reenlistments: Final Report, 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2004), 64. 
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The bonus amount is calculated by multiplying: 
• The Marine’s monthly basic pay at the time of 
discharge or release from active duty; 
• Times the number of years, and/or fraction of the 
years (months) of additional service for which 
the Marine will be obligated beyond existing 
obligated service; 
• Times the SRB Program multiple, not to exceed 10, 
for the applicable MOS as designated in the 
current Marine Corps Bulletin 7220 series.21 
By looking at the growth of the Marine Corps’ SRB 
budget over the last five years, Figure 1, it is apparent 
that the Marine Corps placed a large value on the SRB 
program as a manpower tool.  In fiscal year 2008, 15,737 
Marines received a reenlistment bonus for a total cost of 
$452,000,000.22  It was a major influential tool in the 
202,000 authorized plus-up.  Due to a successful SRB 
program and the unforeseen economic downturn of 2008 and 
2009, the Marine Corps was able to meet end strength goals 
two years early, causing a suspension of reenlistment 
                     
21 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Order 7220.24M: Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus Program (Washington D.C.: Headquarters United States 
Marine Corps, 1990). 
22 U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010 Budget Estimates Submission, Justification of Estimates, May 
2009, Military Personnel, Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2008). 
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/10pres/MPMC_Justification_Book.pdf 
(accessed: 19 January 2010). 
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bonuses.23  However, once the economy begins to grow the 
usual MOS specific manpower shortages may become visible 
again.  Also, the SRB program is the largest discretionary 
item in the Marine Corps’ manpower account and, therefore, 
it is an easy target for cuts when shortfalls occur.24 
 
Figure 1.   U.S. Marine Corps SRB Expenditures, 1998-2010 
(U.S. Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates Submission, 
Justification of Estimates, May 2009, Military 
Personnel, Marine Corps) 
1. Weaknesses 
While the SRB is selective by MOS and years-of-
service, it is important to note that it is equally 
available to all qualified Marines regardless of their  
 
                     
23 U.S. Marine Corps Bulletin 7220, Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10) Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program and FY10 Broken Service SRB (BSSRB) 
Program, MARADMIN 0378/09, 24 June 2009. 
24 Anita U. Hattiangadi et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum 
Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C Reenlistments: Final Report, 
(Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2004), 10. 
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intent or willingness to reenlist.  Marines who are 
eligible to reenlist generally fall into one of three 
groups: 
1. Marines who would be willing to reenlist for only 
a fraction of the SRB amount, or none at all; 
2. Marines who would be willing to reenlist for the 
exact SRB amount; 
3. Marines who would be willing to reenlist, but 
only for an amount that is higher than the SRB 
being offered.25 
Marines who are eligible for the SRB will almost 
exclusively come from group 1, shown in Figure 2, and will  
receive a larger bonus than what was required to retain the 
individual.26  This excess distribution of resources, money 
in this case, is also known as economic rent.  It is in the 
best interest of the Marine Corps to obtain the required 
manpower needed by accurately setting the bonus amount 
while paying as little economic rent as possible. 
                     
25 Paul B. Bock, “The Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism for 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses: Potential Cost Savings to the U.S. 
Marine Corps,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 9. 
26 Ibid., 9. 
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Figure 2.   Reenlistment Individuals Fall Into Three Groups 
One of the main drawbacks of the current SRB program 
is that the military services cannot identify those who 
would have reenlisted without the bonus or with a much 
smaller bonus.27  Although the SRB attempts to be as 
accurate as possible, it likely over estimates the cost of 
retaining the required number of individuals in a specific 
MOS.  The supply of labor can only be estimated; for this 
reason, setting the most economically efficient bonus 
amount is difficult.   
As shown in Figure 3, if the goal is to have L number of 
people reenlist and the bonus is set at 40k, then only L’ 
                     
27 Michael L. Hansen and Martha Koopman, Military Compensation Reform 
in the Department of the Navy, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval 
Analyses, 2005), 29. 
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would be willing to reenlist at that amount, resulting in a 
manpower shortage in a required specialty.  The exact 
shortage would be L – L’.  On the other hand, if an SRB 
amount is too high, e.g., 60k as shown in Figure 3, the 
military will be able to retain all the required manpower in 
a specific MOS, point L, and it would have to reject 
individuals because L’’ would be willing to reenlist.  
Additionally, setting a higher SRB amount results in higher 
economic rent, which is depicted as the shaded area labeled 
A.  All the individuals in the shaded area would have 
reenlisted for 50k or less; however, since the SRB was set at 
60k, everyone received 10k (60k - 50k = 10k) more than 
required.  It is unlikely that statistical analysis or any 
other non-market approach will be sufficiently accurate to 
consistently determine the market-clearing SRB level.28 
 
                     
28 Peter J. Coughlan and William R. Gates, “Auction Mechanisms For 
Force Management,” in Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply about 
Diversity in the US Armed Forces, ed. James E. Parco and David A. Levy 
(Alabama: Air University Press, 2010), 510. 
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Figure 3.   Weaknesses of the Current SRB Program 
Another weakness of the SRB program is that all 
Marines in the qualifying MOS are eligible for the bonus, 
regardless of their willingness or propensity to reenlist.  
Even if the exact bonus amount could be estimated, and the 
exact numbers of reenlistments were met, everyone would get 
the same bonus that was required to attract the very last 
person.  The shaded area in Figure 4 identifies the 
additional income transfers, known as economic rent, 
provided to all service members.  Only the individual at L 
receives the exact amount required to elicit a decision to 
reenlist.  Person X would have reenlisted for 20k; however, 
that service member receives an additional 30k. 
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Figure 4.   Uniform Distribution of the SRB Program 
These two well-known issues can be identified as a 
precision problem and a cost-effectiveness problem. 
• Precision — determining the appropriate incentive 
to precisely achieve the targeted end-strength 
goal. 
• Cost-effectiveness — the associated “surplus” 
income transfers from the military to service 
members when the same incentive is provided to all 
retained service members.29 
Much research has been done on the potential for using 
auctions to determine an individual’s reservation wage, 
thereby identifying the exact amount required by an 
individual to stay in the military.  By knowing 
individuals’ reservation wages, the military would know the 
exact cost of retaining an exact number of individuals. 
                     
29 Peter J. Coughlan and William R. Gates, “Auction Mechanisms For 
Force Management,” in Attitudes Aren’t Free: Thinking Deeply about 
Diversity in the US Armed Forces, ed. James E. Parco and David A. Levy 
(Alabama: Air University Press, 2010), 519. 
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Building on the concept of auctions, NMIs can be used 
in support of monetary incentives, thus creating 
combinatorial auctions for military manpower.  Such 
auctions are considered “combinatorial” because they 
involve eliciting bids for (or choices among) (a) various 
combinations of NMIs as well as (b) the combination of NMIs 
with traditional monetary incentives.  Prior research with 
the U.S. Navy has shown that individuals place a high value 
on the ability to select NMIs that they value.  Not only do 
service members place a value on individually selected 
NMIs, research has shown that such a method would be very 
cost effective if implemented.30 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The military compensation system is a critical 
component in maintaining an all-volunteer force.  It is 
composed of a complex mix of basic pay, monetary and non-
monetary allowances, special pays, and bonuses.  These 
tools are used to manage and shape the force as required. 
The SRB is one tool that is used to meet short-term 
needs by influencing individuals in specific MOSs to 
reenlist for a given period of time in return for a 
monetary incentive.  Over the years, this method has become 
increasingly expensive and has known problems concerning 
precision and cost-effectiveness. 
 
 
                     
30 Brook M. Zimmerman, "Integrating Monetary and Non-Monetary 
Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM)," (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 
127. 
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Prior research postulates that combinatorial auctions 
can be used in the reenlistment bonus program, which would 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 23
III. AUCTION MECHANISMS 
“The services should explore other pays, such as 
reenlistment bonuses, which could potentially use 
an auction mechanism to incorporate member 
preferences into payment rates.”31 
- 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter explains and describes the use of 
auctions in the military labor market.  It discusses the 
first- and second-price auction mechanisms and how 
including combinations of NMIs can decrease cost to the 
military services while increasing the total value given to 
individual service members.  The literature promotes the 
second-price sealed-bid reverse auction because of its 
truth-revealing design.  The first-price auction lacks 
important qualities but it also deserves attention.  Much 
of this chapter is based on prior thesis work and 
summarizes the main points. 
B. WHAT IS AN AUCTION? 
“Auctions ask and answer the most fundamental 
questions in economics: who should get the goods and at 
what price?”32  The auction variation is determined by 
number of buyers and sellers, the environment, and the 
ultimate objective.  Auctions can be used by a single 
                     
31 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation, vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 13. 
32 Peter Cramton, Yoav Shomham, and Richard Steinberg, Combinatorial 
Auctions, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), l-2.  
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seller to sell goods when faced with many potential buyers 
(standard or forward auction) or by a single buyer to buy 
goods when faced with many potential sellers (reverse 
auction).  Auctions often are used in the marketplace to 
buy and sell material goods; however, auctions seldom are 
used in the labor market to buy and sell individual labor 
services.  In the military labor market, the military is a 
single buyer facing many individuals who are the potential 
sellers; the military wants to buy labor. 
C. AUCTION DESIGNS 
1. English Auction 
An English auction is the most well-known type of 
auction.  It is used for real estate, motor vehicles, and 
goods online via Web sites like eBay where there is a 
single seller and multiple buyers (bidders).  The English 
auction consists of interactions and competition among the 
bidders.  The price generally starts low when someone 
submits the first bid for the good; then other potential 
buyers increase their bids, agreeing to a higher price.  
The price of the item increases incrementally until no one 
else is willing to raise the bid.  The last bidding person 
then receives the item for the price he or she stated.  The 
most important aspect of the English auction is that all 
potential buyers know the current bids as the auction 
progresses. 
2. Dutch Auction 
The Dutch auction is similar to the English auction in 
the sense that all the bidders are present (physically or 
virtually) at the auction at the same time.  Rather than 
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starting low, however, the price starts very high and then 
the auctioneer decreases the price gradually until one 
bidder agrees to the price.  There is only one bid in a 
Dutch auction, it is awarded to the first person who calls 
out or otherwise announces his or her willingness to pay 
the current price.  Unlike the English auction, in which 
all the bidders could observe bids from the other bidders, 
the Dutch auction only reveals one bid; that of the highest 
willing bidder.  The bidders want to maximize their gain, 
but they need to speculate what competing buyers would be 
willing to pay. 
3. Sealed-Bid Auctions 
The open English and Dutch auctions present a problem 
for military labor markets because all the bidders need to 
simultaneously be present, or online, throughout the 
bidding process.  This is unrealistic with military 
personnel operating worldwide.  However, a sealed-bid 
auction offers a solution.  Bids can be submitted over a 
period of weeks or months; the simultaneous physical or 
virtual presence of the bidders is not required.  Similar 
to the Dutch auction, bidders have no way of knowing how 
other competitors value the items.  Additionally, a bidder 
does not have the opportunity to increase or decrease their 
bid once it is submitted. 
There are two main types of sealed-bid auctions: 
a. First-Price 
This is a common form of the sealed-bid auction.  
Bidders submit sealed bids; once all the bids are 
collected, the winner is the person who submitted the 
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highest bid, paying the value of their bid for the item.  
Competitors have no way of changing their bid once 
submitted or knowing what other competitors have bid.  
Bidders attempt to maximize their gain while still 
receiving the item; this means that an individual’s bid is 
influenced by expectations of what bids may be submitted by 
other bidders.  The optimal bidding strategy is to bid 
below the true maximum price the bidder is willing to pay, 
creating individual gain but increasing the risk of losing 
the auction.  The first-price auction forces bidders to 
guess what others are bidding, resulting in potentially 
inefficient outcomes if bidders have different expectations 
(and thus use different bidding strategies).33 
b. Second-Price 
In a second-price sealed-bid auction, also known 
as a Vickrey auction, the winner with the highest bid pays 
an amount equal to the first-highest rejected bid.  For 
example, if the winning bidder bids $20 and the highest 
losing bid is $17, the winner pays $17.  Instead of paying 
the clearing price, the winner just pays the opportunity 
cost for the good.34  This auction format has a truth 
revealing nature, meaning that the optimal bidding strategy 
is to bid one’s true value for a product or service.  This 
is the critical difference between a first- and second-
price auction.  This auction mechanism is less widely used; 
however, it is very similar to the first-price auction, the 
                     
33 Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom, Combinatorial Auctions, ed. 
Peter Cramton, Yoav Shomham, and Richard Steinberg, (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2006), 80. 
34 Ibid., 19. 
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highest valued bidder receives the item but pays a price 
equal to the second highest value. 
The 2009 CRAM Technical Report provides a more 
detailed explanation about auction theory and the truth-
revealing nature of the second-price sealed-bid auction.35 
D. USING AUCTIONS FOR MILITARY LABOR 
The previous section presented different auction 
designs and explained that the first-price sealed-bid 
auction and the second-price sealed-bid auctions are 
applicable for military labor markets.  This section will 
explain in more detail on how both mechanisms work.  Before 
doing so, it is important to understand an individual’s 
reservation value. 
1. Reservation Value 
The reservation value is the minimum compensation for 
which, if given by the military, the person would continue 
their military service.  A person’s reservation value is 
generally estimated internally using the same concept as 
the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model.  The ACOL 
approach models an individual’s decision to stay or leave 
the military based on the monetary differences between 
military and civilian employment.  Monetary differences are 
the primary interest in the model, but there is also a 
variable that incorporates an individual's “taste” or 
                     
35 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary 
and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment Incentives,” (Techincal report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 14. 
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preference for military versus civilian life.36  As 
described, every person has a different reservation value; 
it is individually calculated by evaluating civilian 
employment opportunities and one’s taste for the military 
lifestyle.  Someone who likes the military lifestyle might 
be willing to receive $10,000 less annually than for 
equivalent work in the civilian sector.  Someone who 
dislikes the military lifestyle might be prepared to leave 
even though the military was paying $15,000 more than what 
he or she could receive in the civilian market. 
2. First-Price (or Discriminatory-Price) Auction 
When applying the first-price auction approach to the 
market for military labor, the winners (those whose bids 
were accepted and therefore are employed by the military) 
would be paid the value of their bids.   
Figure 5 is an example of how a first-price auction 
would work in this context.  All 30 service members would 
submit their bonus requests; assume for the moment that 
service members submit bids equal to their reservation 
values, an assumption relaxed below.  The military service 
would then rank the requested bonus amounts based on cost.  
If only 20 services members were required, then person 20 
would receive $10,000 and person 10 would get $5,000 to 
reenlist for a predetermined amount of time.  Persons 21–30 
would not be offered a bonus and they would have to find 
employment elsewhere.  Note that each individual who was 
selected for reenlistment and paid a bonus receives a 
                     
36 John T. Warner and Matthew S. Goldberg, “The Influence of Non-
Pecuniary Factors on Labor Supply: The Case of Navy Enlisted 
Personnel,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 66, 1984, 27. 
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different amount, ranging from $10,000 to 0.  For this 
reason, this variation of the first-price auction approach, 
in which there are multiple winners who each contract at a 
different price (not the first price), is known as a 
discriminatory price auction.37  Total cost to retain the 20 
services members is approximately $100,000 (20 * 10,000 * 
0.5 = 100,000).  
  
Figure 5.   First-Price Auction Example 
At first glance this auction appears to be efficient 
because the employer is not over compensating those willing 
to stay for lesser amounts.  However, the optimal strategy 
in the discriminatory-price auction is not to bid one’s 
reservation value as assumed above, but to instead bid 
somewhat above this amount.  It is in the best interest of 
each individual to estimate what others are bidding and 
                     
37 In economics, “price discrimination” refers to the practice of 
charging (or receiving) difference prices from different individuals. 
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then try to bid just below the expected cutoff (the amount 
of the lowest losing bid).  This allows an individual to 
win the auction while maximizing their surplus.  Also, 
individual’s bids will be highly influenced by their level 
of risk tolerance. 
Figure 6 presents the same scenario; however, it has 
individuals attempting to bid optimally.  Each person is 
trying to bid right below what they expect the cutoff bid 
amount to be.  The military services still retain 20 
members, however, at a much different cost.  In reality it 
costs approximately $200,000 (20 * 5,000 + 20 * 10,000 * 
0.5 = 200,000) shown by the shaded sections.  The darker 
shaded triangle shows the cost if everyone bid their true 
value.  Appendix A provides additional information on the 
calculations for determining the expected profit-maximizing 
bid.  Other variables that could affect the optimal bid 
include the relative risk tolerance for each individual and 
the information provided to the bidders.  Those who were 
more risk averse would underbid relative to those who were 
less risk averse.  This auction mechanism would 
systematically retain those people who are most willing to 
remain in service, while also making those who are more 
risk-averse somewhat more likely to be retained (given 
similar reservation values).  The amount of information 
provided to bidders is also critical in decision making.  
If bidders were told how many people were going to be 
retained they would bid differently than if they had no 
knowledge, depending on whether they over- or under-
estimated the number retained and their risk tolerance. 
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Figure 6.   First-Price Auction Optimal Strategy 
Another issue which should not be ignored is that each 
service member receives a different bonus payment among the 
same MOS.  The discriminatory-price auction mechanism 
creates unequal compensation and may result in morale 
issues and tension within the operating forces because of 
pay inequality. 
3. Second-Price (or Uniform-Price) Auction 
When using a second-price auction approach in military 
labor markets, the winning bidders would all be paid the 
first highest rejected bid.  In other words, each person 
who was retained would be paid the same amount. 
Figure 7 shows an example of a second-price auction in 
this context.  Individuals 1-30 submitted bonus requests 
and the military service only needed 20 individuals.  The 
first highest rejected bid is the 21st person, their bid is 
near 10k.  Persons 21–30 are not retained because they were 
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over the cutoff.  Persons 1–20 are all paid 10k, resulting 
in a total cost of approximately $200,000 (20 * 10,000 = 
200,000).  Note that retained service members are not 
actually paid the second-price in this example but are 
instead paid the 21st-price (i.e. the 21st lowest bid).  More 
generally, when the second-price auction approach is 
generalized to allow for some number N winners, the winning 
bidders will all pay or receive the (N+1)st price.  Because 
all winners pay or receive the same amount, the multiple-




Figure 7.   Second-Price Auction Example 
Recall that in the first-price auction the total cost 
was calculated to be $200,000 as well.  Both the first and 
second-price auctions result in the same number of retained 
personnel and are revenue (or cost) equivalent under 
certain reasonable conditions.  However, in a second-price 
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auction it is optimal for individuals to bid their true 
valuation, also known as truth revealing. 
E. DISCRIMINATORY OR UNIFORM? 
Initially, the discriminatory-price auction appears to 
be the most cost effective because the military avoids 
paying economic rent, meaning money savings.  However, that 
presumes that bidders do not bid optimally.  There may be a 
learning effect for bidders.  At first individuals might 
underbid but begin to bid optimally once they figure out 
the optimal strategy.  Also, service members of the same 
MOS who received the bonus would get paid different 
amounts.  This inefficiency might cause morale problems and 
resentment among the fighting force.  Additionally, the 
discriminatory-price auction is somewhat biased toward 
risk-averse individuals.  Lastly, the discriminatory and 
uniform auction mechanisms are revenue or cost equivalent 
in theory, as shown by Figures 6 and 7 and further 
supported by Appendix A.   
For these reasons, the uniform-price auction has many 
advantages over the discriminatory-price auction.  
Additionally, the uniform-price auction has the benefit of 
being truth revealing.  The truth revealing nature of the 
uniform-price auction allows services to actually track 
individual’s opportunity costs.  An individual who bids a 
high reservation value suggests that he/she has profitable 
civilian opportunities or a lower proclivity for military 
service.  Those individuals that bid lower suggest that 
they are better off in the military service.  Data gathered 
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could be used to evaluate how service members value their 
employment and be used to forecast future manpower costs. 38 
In review, both auctions select the required number of 
individuals at the lowest cost, yet they both have very 
different characteristics.  The discriminatory-price 
auction might be cheaper in the short-run if individuals do 
not initially bid optimally; in the long run, however, both 
the uniform- and discriminatory-price auctions are revenue 
equivalent.  The uniform-price auction provides many 
advantages that make it better, such as equal payments, 
independent of risk preferences, and truth revealing. 
F. MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES 
Chapter II discussed military compensation and showed 
that it consists primarily of monetary compensation.  In 
2007, research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) by Constance M. Denmond and others explained that 
pure monetary incentives are inadequate for addressing many 
reasons why service members decide to leave the military.39  
The research was directed toward Naval Surface Warfare 
Officers; however, the reasons for individuals departing 
military service can be related to the USMC and most MOSs.  
The research gave support for using NMIs as retention 
tools. 
                     
38 Benjamin M. Cook, “Using a Second-Price Auction to Set Military 
Retention Bonus Levels: An Application to the Australian Army,” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 37. 
39 Constance M. Denmond et al., “Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied 
to the Selection of Surface Warfare Incentives,” (MBA professional 
report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 69. 
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G. NON-MONETARY RETENTION INCENTIVES 
The Tenth Quadrennial Review provides support for the 
use of individually selected NMIs.  The following excerpt 
explains how flexible benefits could encourage reenlistment 
and retention. 
Equally important is the need to offer greater 
choice for the service member when such choice is 
consistent with the mission requirements.  When 
member preferences for type of assignments, where 
they are stationed, or frequency and duration of 
deployments are consistent with the operational 
requirements, the compensation system should 
offer appropriate incentives to support such 
choice.  Flexible benefit arrangements offer 
another mechanism to introduce choice for the 
member.  And providing service members with 
adequate compensation encourages reenlistment, 
and potentially, enlistment decisions.  The 
ultimate payoff is in member satisfaction, which 
in turn positive impact volunteerism.40 
As previously mentioned, research has shown that money 
is often not the main force influencing individuals’ 
decisions to stay in the military; NMIs can serve as 
powerful retention tools.  Examples of NMIs may include 
homeport choice, geographic stability, and sabbaticals.  By 
combining cash bonuses with NMIs, individuals have the 
opportunity to get more utility through highly valued NMIs 
while still receiving a monetary incentive.  The military 
services have the opportunity to save money by providing 
NMIs and decreasing overall monetary payouts.  A tool used 
to incorporate monetary and NMIs into auctions to maximize 
value for individual service members while minimizing cost 
                     
40 U.S. Department of Defense, Undersecretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, The 10th Quadrennial Review of Military 
Compensation, vol. 1, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), xxi. 
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to the military service is known as the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  CRAM establishes 
individualized incentive packages for services members that 
reflect their personal preferences between money and 
different NMIs.  
H. VALUING COMBINATIONS OF NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES 
Any retention mechanism which attempts to tradeoff a 
monetary incentive for multiple non-monetary incentives 
must recognize that NMIs are often valued differently 
depending on what other NMIs are provided in combination.  
Much of the research thus far which has investigated 
various aspects of monetary incentives and NMIs has assumed 
a consistent independent additive effect for the value of 
NMIs.  In other words, it has generally been assumed that 
the value of any combination of NMIs is simply equal to the 
sum of the “stand-alone” values for those NMIs.  In 
reality; however, this is not the likely case most of the 
time.  Combining two NMIs that are complementary generates 
a combined value that is super-additive (or greater than 
the sum of the individual values).  On the other hand, 
combining two NMIs that are substitutes may create a 
combined value that is sub-additive, or less than the sum 
of the individual NMI values.41 
1. Additive 
Prior research has assumed a perfectly independent 
additive relationship when combining NMIs.  While this is 
                     
41 Jason B. Ellis, "Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary 
Incentives: Motivating and Implementing the Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism," (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 
44. 
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possible, it is unlikely that an individual’s value for a 
NMI stays constant as it is combined with other NMIs.  
Figure 8 presents an example of additive NMIs. 
 
Figure 8.   Additive NMIs 
2. Super-Additive 
Suppose an individual values geographic stability for 
three tours at $15,000 and homeport of choice at $10,000; 
it has been assumed that combining them would result in an 
individual value for the two NMIs at $25,000 ($15,000 + 
$10,000 = $25,000).  In reality, the individual may place a 
very high value on that combination of NMIs, hypothetically 
$40,000.  The reason for the value increase can only be 
speculated, but may include spouse’s work stability and/or 
children staying longer in a specific school district.  
Therefore, depending on the cost to the military services, 
much value can be created by combining synergistic NMIs.  
Figure 9 presents an example of super-additive NMIs.  
 
Figure 9.   Super-Additive NMIs 
3. Sub-Additive 
Just as NMIs can become more valuable in combination, 
they can also become less valuable.  For example, an 
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individual may value homeport of choice at $15,000 and 
telecommuting at $8,000.  In combination, these may become 
valued at $17,000.  Again, reasons for sub-additive effects 
can only be speculated.  One scenario might suggest minimal 
commuting cost and inconvenience in the homeport of choice 
reducing the value of working remotely.  Figure 10 presents 
an example of sub-additive NMIs. 
 
Figure 10.   Sub-Additive NMIs 
I. DO INDIVIDUALS MAKE RATIONAL DECISIONS? 
Do individuals make rational decisions when evaluating 
and combining NMIs utilizing the CRAM method?  NPS research 
conducted in 2009 determined, for the most part, that 
individuals make rational choices when introducing NMIs.42  
However, the previous researchers purposely assumed a 
perfectly additive relationship when combining NMIs to 
focus their study.  This thesis builds on that research by 
investigating how individuals respond to non-additive 
values for various combinations of NMIs.  
J. THE COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
includes three elements, each serving a specific purpose. 
                     
42 Amanda G. Browning and Clinton F. Burr, “Monetary and Non-Monetary 
SWO Retention Bonuses: An Experimental Approach to the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM),” (MBA professional report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 35. 
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1. An NMI allocation process which lowers the cost 
to retain any service members who value NMIs more 
than the dollar cost to provide those NMIs; 
2. A combinatorial auction mechanism which provides 
individualized incentive packages with no 
"wasted" incentives; 
3.  A monetary auction component which automatically 
and endogenously sets monetary retention 
incentives at the absolute minimum cost necessary 
to achieve specific end-strength targets.43 
1. NMI Allocation: Cost vs. Value 
CRAM is designed such that service members should only 
receive an NMI if he/she values it more than it costs to 
provide.  Therefore, all potential NMIs are offered to 
eligible service members and, if an individual places a 
higher value on the incentive than it costs to provide, 
that individual should receive it.  In other words, CRAM is 
designed such that, for any given NMI, only service members 
who would rather receive the NMI than a cash amount equal 
to the NMI cost end up receiving that NMI.  This ensures 
that the individual gains value and the military service 
reduces cost simultaneously.  The value gain and cost saved 
depends on how much value the individual receives from a 
particular NMI relative to its cost. 
Figure 11 provides a visual representation of the 
different values a target community might assign to a 
particular NMI relative to the cost of that NMI.  The 
horizontal line in the diagram depicts the unit cost of the 
hypothetical NMI while the downward-sloping diagonal line 
                     
43 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary 
and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment Incentives,” (Techincal report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 78.  
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depicts the demand for that NMI which is given by the 
varying values assigned to the NMI among the service 
members targeted for retention. 
 
Figure 11.   NMIs: Cost vs. Value (From Coughlan and 
Gates, 2007) 
Note that, in Figure 11, value can be gained (and cost 
saved) by providing the NMI to those individuals who value 
it more than cost (those who are represented in the upper 
part of the demand curve).  Providing the NMI to these 
individuals is a stronger retention incentive than 
providing a cash amount equivalent to the unit cost of the 
NMI.  Hence, it is a win-win outcome to provide the NMI to 
those individuals. 
Conversely, providing the NMI to those individuals who 
value it less than cost (those who are represented in the 
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lower part of the demand curve) is a lose-lose outcome.  
Providing the NMI to these individuals is a weaker 
retention incentive than providing a cash amount equivalent 
to the unit cost of the NMI.  CRAM is consequently designed 
to only provide any particular NMI to those service members 
who value it more than cost. 
2. Individualized Incentive Packages 
CRAM creates an individualized monetary and NMI 
package for each service member.  The optimal incentive 
package would include NMIs that are of high value to the 
individual but low cost to the government.  By the 
selection of NMIs that are valued greater than cost, both 
parties can be better off. 
Figure 12 presents an example of how various NMIs 
might have different costs to the military and how 
different bidders might value the NMIs.  Theoretically, 
geographic stability and homeport choice offers value 
greater than cost for most individuals, while sabbatical 
and telecommuting appear to cost the military more in 
relation to most people’s value for the NMIs.  For these 
reasons it is not beneficial to provide NMIs “universally” 
to all service member;, however, CRAM allows the military 
services to offer all NMIs to service members (even those 
that are only highly valued by a small population) knowing 
that each NMI will only be allocated to those individuals 
who value it more than cost.  Offering all NMIs, but only 
providing each NMI to individuals who value it more than 
cost ensures that there are no “wasted” NMIs. 
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Figure 12.   NMI Portfolio (From Coughlan and Gates, 
2007) 
3. Monetary Auction: Setting a Precise Cash Bonus 
In addition to the allocation of non-monetary 
incentives, the CRAM mechanism also incorporates a monetary 
auction in which eligible service members submit a sealed-
bid reflecting the monetary incentive they would require to 
commit to a further service obligation.  Whereas SRB 
bonuses and other cash retention incentives have 
traditionally been set using statistical analysis or rules-
of-thumb, the monetary auction component of CRAM 
endogenously and automatically (without the need for any 
economic or statistical analysis) determines the most cost-
effective cash bonus amount (or amounts, as described  
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below) which will allow the military service to precisely 
meet its end-strength goal for the particular cohort or 
specialty.  
K. CRAM VARIATIONS AND PROCESS 
In order to understand exactly how the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism actually works, it is important 
to first explain the four primary variations of CRAM, as 
each variation will operate somewhat differently.  The four 
variations of CRAM are illustrated in Figure 13 and are 
classified based on two dimensions: (1) The NMI allocation 






















Figure 13.   CRAM Variations 
1. NMI Allocation: Menu-Method vs. Bid-Method 
Under CRAM, NMIs can be allocated in one of two ways: 
The menu-method or the bid-method.  Under the menu-method, 
eligible service members are presented all the available 
NMIs, along with their associated costs to provide.  
Service members then select from this “menu” of NMIs, 
knowing that they will receive any NMI selected if 
retained, but also that the military service will include 
in his/her cost to retain (see below) the combined cost of 
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all NMIs selected.  The service member can select no NMIs, 
one NMI, all NMIs, or any combination of available NMIs.  
Each service member does best by determining which 
combination of NMIs hold the greatest value relative to 
cost. 
It is also important to note that, under the menu-
method, a service member’s bid for a monetary retention 
incentive reflects the cash amount he/she would require in 
addition to any NMIs selected.  Thus, the monetary bids 
submitted under the menu-method are “post-NMI” cash 
incentive bids. 
Under variations of CRAM using the bid-method, service 
members submit individual bids for each NMI offered, with 
the bid amounts reflecting the amount of cash bonus he/she 
would be willing to give up in exchange for each particular 
NMI (if retained).  Service-members are not provided any 
costs associated with the NMIs under the bid-method; 
however, they will receive any NMI for which they submit a 
bid greater than cost if they are retained.  As with the 
menu-method, the military service will include in his/her 
cost to retain (see below) the combined cost of all NMIs 
allocated to him/her. 
Unlike the menu-method, under the bid-method, a 
service member’s bid for a monetary retention incentive 
reflects the cash amount he/she would require without any 
NMIs being allocated.  This is necessary because, without 
knowing NMI costs, the service-member does not know at the 
time of bidding which NMIs he/she will be allocated.  The 
service-member’s combined bids for all NMIs allocated are 
subtracted from this “cash-only” monetary bid to determine 
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the “post-NMI” cash incentive bid which is used to 
determine each service-member’s total retention cost (see 
below). 
The primary advantage of menu-method CRAM is that it 
readily accommodates the combinatorial NMI values as 
described previously.  The service member, who presumably 
has some idea of his/her value of the various combinations 
of NMIs, incorporates these combinatorial values into his 
or her selection of the package of NMIs whose combined 
value exceeds the combined cost by the greatest amount 
(this is the optimal choice).  The primary disadvantage of 
the menu-method CRAM, on the other hand, is that a 
reasonable estimate of the cost of providing each NMI must 
be known and published in advance, which can be 
particularly problematic for those NMIs whose cost depends 
on the number of service members who choose that particular 
NMI (such as geographic stability, homeport of choice, 
billet of choice, etc.). 
The bid-method advantages and disadvantages are the 
mirror image of the menu-method advantage and 
disadvantages.  Unlike the menu-method CRAM, the bid-method 
does not incorporate combinatorial NMI values effectively, 
unless service members are asked to submit separate bids 
for each possible combination of NMIs.  To request bids on 
all combinations; however, can quickly become unwieldy.  
For example, with 10 NMIs available, there are 1023 
different NMI combinations on which service members would 
have to bid.  The primary advantage of the bid-method; 
however, is that the cost of each NMI does not necessarily 
need to be known in advance.  In particular, after 
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eliciting the NMI bids, decision-makers can estimate the 
demand curve for each NMI (the number of service-members 
whose bid is higher than each possible price or cost point) 
and then determine the “market-clearing” price (where the 
cost curve intersects the demand curve). 
2. Determining Winners: Total Retention Cost 
After receiving all NMI selections or bids and all 
monetary incentive bids, the military service calculates 
the total retention cost for each service member.  This 
cost is given by: 
Total Retention Cost = “Post-NMI” Cash Incentive Bid + 
Total Cost of Allocated NMIs 
The military service will then retain the set of 
lowest-total-cost service members.  For example, if end-
strength goals dictate that 2,000 service-members from a 
particular specialty in a particular grade must be retained 
in a particular year, then the military service will retain 
the 2,000 service-members among this group whose total 
retention costs are the 2,000 lowest costs.  Each service 
member retained would then receive any NMIs allocated to 
him or her as well as a cash bonus whose amount depends 
upon the pricing rule being used, as described in the next 
section. 
3. Price Determination: Discriminatory vs. Uniform 
The basic discriminatory-price and uniform-price 
auction rules were described in the early chapter on 
auction mechanisms.  Although a bit more complex, the 
basics of these two pricing rules translate readily to 
pricing under CRAM. 
 47
Under discriminatory-price CRAM variations, each 
retained service member receives the exact cash bonus 
he/she requests and, under the bid-method, pays out of this 
bonus the exact amount he/she bid for each NMI allocated.  
Thus, under the discriminatory-price CRAM, each retained 
service member receives a cash bonus given by: 
 Cash Bonus = “Post-NMI” Cash Incentive Bid 
Recall that, under a traditional uniform-price 
auction, all winning bidders pay or receive an amount equal 
to the first excluded bid.  As implemented under CRAM, the 
uniform-price rule dictates that each winning bidder 
receives a retention package (cash plus NMIs) whose total 
cost is equal to the first-excluded retention cost (the 
lowest total retention cost among those service members not 
retained). 
Thus, under the uniform-price CRAM, each retained 
service member receives a cash bonus given by: 
 Cash Bonus = First Excluded Total Retention Cost – 
Total Cost of Allocated NMIs 
Under all CRAM variations, the total value to the 
service member includes the service member’s cash bonus 
plus the value of any allocated NMIs.  If service members 
have selected or bid for NMIs wisely, the value to the 
service member should exceed the cost for all allocated 
NMIs, and thus the total value received by an individual 
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will always be either equal to or greater than the actual 
cost to retain the service member.44 
L. EXAMPLE OF CRAM IN ACTION: UNIFORM-PRICE BID-METHOD 
As further illustration of how the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism operates, consider an example 
of the uniform-price bid-method CRAM with three Navy 
sailors being considered for retention and two NMIs 
offered, each costing the Navy $20,000 to provide.  For the 
purpose of this example, suppose that two of these three 
sailors are to be retained and that NMI values are 
additive.  Figure 14 illustrates such a scenario and how 
the uniform-price bid-method CRAM would be applied.  The 
columns two through four in the figure show the sailors’ 
cash only costs to retain (i.e., true reservation value), 
and the values they receive from each of two NMIs, 
respectively.  
                     
44 Peter J. Coughlan, William R. Gates and Brooke M. Zimmerman, “The 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM): Integrating Monetary 
and Non-Monetary Re-Enlistment Incentives,” (Techincal report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 78. 
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Figure 14.   Example: CRAM (From Coughlan and Gates, 
2007) 
If a purely monetary uniform-price retention auction 
were used, the sailors would optimally bid their true 
reservation values (column two).  Thus, sailors 1 and 2 
would be retained at a bonus equal to the bid submitted by 
sailor 3 ($100,000), and the total cost to retain two out 
of the three sailors would be $200,000. 
Under the uniform-price bid-method CRAM, on the other 
hand, the sailors would also do best by bidding their true 
value for each of the NMIs.  Thus, sailor 1 would be 
allocated NMI 1, sailor 2 would be allocated NMI 2, and 
sailor 3 would be allocated NMIs 1 and 2, resulting in the 
NMI costs and values shown in columns five and six, 
respectively. 
The military would then reduce the cash incentive bids 
by the value (or bids) for the NMIs allocated, resulting in 
the revised cash retention bonus depicted in column seven.  
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The military cost to retain each sailor, their revised cash 
bid plus the cost of the selected NMIs, is provided in 
column eight.  Sailor 2 would thus be separated under CRAM 
and would set the total retention cost for the retained 
sailors, $80,000 per sailor.  Hence, CRAM reduces the total 
cost to retain two sailors to $160,000, saving $40,000 with 
just two sailors. 
The final two columns in the figure show the cash 
bonus paid to each retained sailor (the military cost for 
the first excluded sailor minus the cost of NMIs awarded), 
and the total value received by each sailor (their cash 
bonus plus the value of the NMIs awarded).  The sailors 
receive a $30,000 greater value than with a monetary 
auction alone, totaling $230,000, because of the NMIs 
provided. 
M. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The CRAM is a tool that incorporates a combination of 
monetary and NMIs and uses the truth revealing second-price 
sealed-bid auction to determine the most cost effective 
service members to retain.  The mechanism can increase 
value for the individual while ensuring cost savings for 
the military services.  This research further investigates 
the effects of combinatorial NMI values and attempts to 
determine if individuals make rational decisions in such 
complex scenarios.   
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Economics studies the choices made under conditions of 
scarcity.45  Like many sciences, economics is observational, 
meaning that theories can be tested and evaluated by 
analyzing data.  Data can be obtained numerous ways, 
conducting an experiment is one form of data collection and 
this practice is known as experimental economics.   
The following chapter provides an introduction into 
experimental economics, discusses types of economic 
experiments, reviews advantages and limitations, and then 
looks at procedural and design considerations.  Much of the 
chapter is referenced from Davis and Holt, Experimental 
Economics.  Ultimately the chapter gives reason and support 
for the experiment conducted in this research.   
B. INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
Econometricians have traditionally obtained data from 
existing “natural” markets to test economic theories and 
develop models.46  Models attempt to untangle the effects of 
interrelated variables while maintaining a level of 
statistical significance.  Depending on the hypothesis being 
tested and the type of data obtained, extraneous factors may 
bias the results and lower the predictive power of the model.  
This becomes even more critical and challenging when 
                     
45 Marc Lieberman and Robert E. Hall, Introduction to Economics, 
Second Edition, (South-Western, 2004), 1. 
46 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3.  
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predictions depend on behavioral assumptions, which are 
difficult to observe in natural markets. 
Other sciences, such as biology, have attempted to 
remove and limit extraneous factors when testing theories 
by systematically collecting data in controlled laboratory 
conditions.  Davis and Holt continue with the concept and 
say, “Although the notion is somewhat novel in economics, 
there is no inherent reason why economic data cannot also 
be obtained from laboratory experiments.”47  The idea of 
using experiments to test economic theories or mechanisms 
is relatively new; however, it has caught on and has served 
an important role in filling the gap between theory and 
observations.48 
While economic experiments are not the cure-all for 
future economic research, they hold many advantages as 
models become more complex.  
C. TYPES OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS 
1. Market Experiments 
Spurred by the market failures during the 1930s Great 
Depression, Edward Chamberlin studied the theory of 
monopolistic competition.49  To test his hypotheses of how 
markets operated he set up simple economic experiments 
using graduate students as subjects.  Chamberlin used cards 
marked with various values and costs and directed students 
to trade, negotiate, buy, and sell with the goal of earning 
                     
47 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 4. 
48 Ibid., 4. 
49 Ibid., 6. 
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hypothetical money.  The students moved around a room 
buying and selling amongst each other.  He was able to 
identify and observe supply and demand curves and create 
price and quantity predictions. 
Chamberlin’s research was published in 1948 and was 
widely ignored, even by himself, due to the novelty of the 
method.50  Fifteen years later, a researcher named Vernon 
Smith, a prior student of Chamberlin, conducted follow-on 
research concerning market experiments.  His research 
involved experiments in which all the data (bids, offers, 
and transaction prices) were public knowledge.  Again, the 
research did not stir much interest but it led the way for 
studies involving competitive price theory. 
In sum, market experiments marked the beginning of 
experimental economics and they involve studying buyers and 
sellers who are jockeying for an equilibrium price (where 
supply meets demand). 
2. Game Experiments 
Game experiments were derived from game theory.  Game 
theory analyzes the strategic behavior of individuals when 
an individual’s choice depends on the choices of others.  
The most well known applied example of game theory is the 
“prisoner’s dilemma.”  The following is an example of the 
situation: 
Suppose that two alleged partners in crime, 
prisoner A and prisoner B, are placed in private 
rooms and are given the same opportunity to 
confess.  If only one of them defects and gives 
                     
50 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6. 
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evidence for the prosecutor, the other receives a 
ten-year sentence, and the prisoner who confesses 
goes free.  If both remain silent, both prisoners 
are sentenced to only one-year in jail for a 
lesser charge.  If both confess, however, they 
each serve five-year terms.  Each prisoner must 
decide to either betray or remain silent.51 
Figure 15 presents the “prisoner’s dilemma” in matrix 
form.  The situation creates an obvious problem, each 
prisoner would be better off if neither confessed but each 
is aware of the other’s incentive to confess.  This 
scenario is easily applied to duopoly pricing strategies, 
in which Firm A or Firm B has an incentive to drastically 
decrease the price of a service or good and take market 
share and profit from the other.  For example, Firm A 
lowers the price of a good and takes business away from 
Firm B.  In response Firm B lowers prices to regain market 
share and profit.  In the end both firms are making less 
profit and worse off. 
 
Figure 15.   The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                     
51 Modified from Douglas D. Davis and Charles A Holt, Experimental 
Economics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 7. 
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The main point in a game experiment is that an 
individual’s decision dependents on another person’s 
possible actions.  Through game experiments, researchers 
can investigate the strategic behavior of individuals when 
their best choice of action depends on the actions of 
others. 
3. Individual-Choice Experiments 
Individual-choice experiments, unlike game 
experiments, do not require strategic behavior, only that 
an individual seeks to optimize their position.  These 
forms of experiments may deal with decision theory, which 
attempts to quantify the process of choosing between 
competing alternatives.52  An experiment may include the 
choice to select two uncertain prospects with differing 
probabilities, uncertainty, or risk.  Individuals try to 
maximize their gain; however, not all individuals act the 
same.  The reason why individuals might act differently 
is because of differing risk tolerances and information. 
An example of how different risk tolerances might 
influence two people can be seen in the following scenario.  
One situation has a guaranteed payoff of $10 for simply 
participating.  The other situation involves flipping a 
coin for a potential payoff of $25 if heads, and $0 if 
tails.  The first scenario has a guaranteed payment of $10 
and the second scenario has an expected value of $12.50 
($25 * 0.5 + $0 * 0.5 = $12.50).  A risk-averse person 
might choose the first scenario for $10 because there is no 
                     
52 Principia Cybernetica Web, Decision Theory, 
http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/DECISI_THEOR.html (accessed 20 February 
2010). 
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uncertainty; a risk-neutral person would select the second 
scenario because of expected value of $12.50.53 
Individual-choice experiments are important to the 
military because they can shed light on peoples’ behavior 
when dealing with decisions of uncertainty.  Scenarios of 
uncertainty include decisions where individuals are trying 
to decide to stay in the military or leaving for the 
private sector. 
D. ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS 
The main advantage of experimentation is replicability 
and control.  Replication provides the opportunity to 
conduct numerous sessions while reducing variability, 
allowing for a bigger data sample and increased 
significance and confidence levels.  Additionally, 
replication is crucial in most areas of study, allowing 
others to independently reproduce the results and evaluate 
the analysis.  Controls are used in experiments to focus 
the purpose of the research.  Natural markets are 
influenced by countless seen and unseen forces that 
influence decisions, by simplifying and controlling many 
factors and using assumptions researchers can focus the 
experiment.54 
There are limitations to running experiments.  The 
most common limitation is that experiments only test a 
specific hypothesis and do not develop alternative 
                     
53 Amanda G. Browning and Clinton F. Burr, “Monetary and Non-Monetary 
SWO Retention Bonuses: An Experimental Approach to the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM),” (MBA professional report, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2009), 26.  
54 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 14-15. 
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hypotheses.  The results of an experiment can only prove or 
disprove a specific hypothesis and if a theory is proven 
wrong a new hypothesis must be developed.  Another 
limitation is the concern of over simplification.  Just as 
controlling for extraneous factors are useful, it can also 
present challenges.  Experiments are supposed to help 
explain the real world; however, experiments are based on a 
simplified version of the real world. 
The subject pool which participates in an experiment 
may present another limitation to experiments.  Since most 
subjects are volunteers there might be selection bias.  
Additionally, many of the research subjects tend to be 
graduate students.  Again, experiments are supposed to 
examine real-world markets and scenarios; however, only a 
small percentage of the population has graduate degrees.  
By understanding the limitations, efforts can be taken to 
identify and address potential issues.55 
In sum, experiments provide many advantages; however, 
they should “complement rather than substitute for other 
empirical techniques.”56 
E. PROCEDURAL AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
Design and procedural considerations can be 
categorized into five groups; procedural regularity, 
motivation, unbiasedness, calibration, and design 
parallelism.57  Each group will be briefly reviewed, 
explaining its significances. 
                     
55 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 16-18. 
56 Ibid., 18. 
57 Ibid., 21. 
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Before moving forward, it is customary to introduce 
specific terminology.  There is no one official standard 
for experimental language; however, the following 
terminology will be used for this research. 
1. Session: a sequence of periods, games, or other 
decision tasks involving the same group of 
subjects on the same day. 
2. Cohort: a group of subjects that participate in a 
session. 
3. Treatment: a unique environment or configuration 
of treatment variables, i.e., of information, 
experience, incentives, and rules. 
4. Cell: a set of sessions with the same 
experimental treatment conditions. 
5. Experiment Design: a specification of sessions in 
one or more cells to evaluate the propositions of 
interest. 
6. Experiment: the collection of sessions in one or 
more related cells. 
7. Trading period, game, or trial: the individual 
unit used to describe separate decisions within a 
session for market experiments, game experiments, 
or individual-choice experiments respectively. 
1. Procedural Regularity 
Detailed and explicit instructions are critical to 
executing a successful experiment.  The instructions should 
be written in a way that allows anyone to read them to the 
subjects and holds everything else constant, the results 
should be similar.  Thorough documentation of the 
experimental process assists with the professional 
credibility.  Ultimately, detailed instructions should 




To motivate participants to behave like they would in 
real life, incentives must be used to reward desired 
actions.  In general, rewards are monetary because of the 
relatively homogeneous value individuals place on money and 
the unlikelihood of experiencing the law of diminishing 
returns given the size of the monetary payments.  Food or 
materialistic goods are not good tools to motivate 
participants because each individual may value the good 
differently and, therefore, have differential incentives, 
whereas money is generally given equal weight by most 
individuals.  The law of diminishing returns is experienced 
when an individual’s demand for a good becomes less and 
less as the individual receives an increasing amount of 
that good.  For example, if mini chocolate bars were used 
as an award, the first few might have tasted good; yet, 
after a while, the individual would no longer desire 
chocolate bars and lose the incentive effect when rewarded 
with chocolate.  Money, unlike chocolate, does not easily 
lose its appeal and, therefore, it is a good tool to 
incentivize people. 
While money serves as a good tool to motivate subjects 
to actively participate, it does not increase the subjects’ 
abilities.  “No amount of money can motivate subjects to 
perform a calculation beyond their intellectual capacities, 
any more than generous bonuses would transform most of us 
into professional athletes.”58  With this understanding, 
money still is considered the best incentive.  
                     
58 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 24. 
 60
3. Unbiasedness 
The subjects used are also important to the success of 
an experiment.  Depending on the purpose and subject of the 
experiment, it might be important to target certain 
volunteers; military, graduate students, or the general 
public.  Since subjects volunteer for the experiment, self-
selection bias might become an issue.  Self-selection bias 
is observed when those who volunteer to participate in an 
experiment are significantly different from those who do 
not participate.  By understanding the subject pool, it can 
be argued that self-selection bias is not present. 
When explaining the experiment to the subjects, it is 
vital to avoid suggestive behavior or language, 
particularly in recruiting subjects (the research questions 
should not be described).  Other than the instructions, 
which were provided to all the subjects, no other 
information should be selectively given to individuals.   
Another important aspect of experimental economics is 
maintaining the trust and respect of the participants.  If 
a participant feels lied to or perceives any deception, the 
quality of the individual’s responses is questionable and 
should likely be discarded. 
4. Calibration 
Obtaining quality data is the primary goal for 
conducting experiments; to ensure the data is valid, it 
must be calibrated.  Calibration provides an outline and a 
clear understanding of the baseline and the variations to 
be measured.  The base line is used to evaluate the 
subjects before any treatment or procedure is introduced.  
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By understanding the baseline and then observing the 
treatment data, the effects can be measured and studied.  
Additionally, it is important to focus the treatment and 
not change too many conditions in one session.  The data 
will be increasingly difficult to analyze if many 
treatments are introduced. 
Order of scenarios during experiment sessions is also 
a major concern because of potential participant learning 
effects.  For example, subjects may be asked to provide 
requested bonus amounts during the first few trials and 
these answers become the baseline.  Then a treatment tool 
is introduced and the subjects are asked to provide more 
bonus requests.  The difference between the first cell and 
the second cell can be attributed either to the treatment 
or the participants’ learning effects.  Different methods 
may be used to control for the learning effect.  
Experimenters may change the order of the treatments, mix 
the treatment and control trials together, or even use only 
one cohort per treatment.  Each method has its advantages 
and disadvantages; by understanding the potential for this 
unwanted effect, steps can be taken to control for it. 
5. Design Parallelism 
The experiment should attempt to resemble reality as 
closely as possible vice the theories devised by 
economists.59  At the same time, the experiment should be 
simplified and focused to evaluate the specific topic.  
There is a balance that should be maintained; too much  
 
                     
59 Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, Experimental Economics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 32. 
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complexity results in data that is difficult to analyze and 
subjects who may have trouble understanding the main 
experimental concept. 
F. WHY THE MILITARY SHOULD CONDUCT ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS 
Before the military commissions a new weapon system or 
vehicle, it goes through a myriad of tests and experiments.  
There is no reason why potential policy changes and 
manpower issues should not go through the same rigors.   
The main benefits of running experiments are the cost 
savings and the ability to capture human behavior.  Cost 
savings are recognized by evaluating issues in a controlled 
setting before fully implementing the new policy or 
process.  More importantly, experiments capture the human 
element.  Theoretical models and statistical analysis can 
only go so far, however.  Experiments provide the link 
between theoretical models and human behavior 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Experimental economics is a relatively new area of 
study, which has shed more light on market, game, and 
individual-choice theories.  Replicability of experiments 
is a major advantage, which allows for the others to 
validate and conduct follow on research on various topics. 
Successful experiments require detailed design and 
specific procedural considerations.  By following basic 
guidelines an experiment can provide excellent data and 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The following chapter provides the experiment 
objectives, design, and hypotheses.  The experiment 
investigated both the discriminatory-price and uniform-
price variations of the menu-method CRAM.  In order to 
obtain a large enough sample size for statistical 
significance, it was necessary to limit the focus of the 
experiment to these two variations of CRAM.  The 
experiments conducted investigated individual behavior and 
mechanism performance in the presence of NMIs with both 
independent and combinatorial values. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW 
1. Recruitment 
Subjects were recruited through e-mail.  A mass e-mail 
was distributed to the Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
requesting volunteers to participate in a decision-making 
experiment.  The letter used to solicit volunteers is 
provided in Appendix B. 
2. Purpose and Design 
The goal of the experiment was to evaluate individual 
choice and bidding behavior as well as overall CRAM 
mechanism performance, particularly in the presence of NMIs 
with interdependent combinatorial values.  The experiment 
isolated compensation, salary and NMIs, as the primary 
motivator for choice of employment between two generic 
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firms, Firm A and Firm B.  Firm B’s standing salary offer 
represented an individual’s opportunity cost and, 
therefore, it became the individual’s reservation value.  
This is what the person could earn if they left Firm A.  In 
comparison to the military, Firm B’s offer represents what 
someone could make in the civilian sector.  The experiment 
was designed not to be military specific, or have any 
military reference, to remove bias.  The decisions 
presented were identical to what a service member would 
experience in real life.  The experiment was broken into 
three treatments: first, a purely monetary retention 
auction; then, menu-method CRAM with NMIs having 
independent additive values; and then menu-method CRAM with 
NMIs having interdependent combinatorial values. 
3. Scenario 
In the experiment, subjects were put in the role of 
one of a hundred employees at Firm A making an employment 
decision.  In the scenario, Firm A is downsizing by 50 
percent.  Another generic company, Firm B, is offering to 
employ all former employees from Firm A.  Subjects have no 
preference for either firm and are only interested in 
maximizing their personal compensation.  Firm B offers each 
a different salary amount; each subject in turn then must 
submit a salary request to Firm A.  Once the bid is 
submitted, there is no way to change the bid for that 
trial.  No matter what happens, a subject will either 
continue working for Firm A or get laid off and work for 
Firm B.  The experiment introduces NMIs and repeats this 
process for each trial.  The instructions used for the 
experiments are in Appendix C. 
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The experiment itself comprises 30 trials and is 
broken into three treatments, ten (10) purely monetary 
trials, ten (10) independent NMI trials, and ten (10) 
combinatorial NMI trials (with potentially sub-additive or 
super-additive values).  The trials are set up in a pyramid 
style, as shown in Table 1.  The reason for the pyramid 
style is to gradually introduce complexity into the process 
and identify learning effects by later eliminating the 
complexity.  Also, experiments are conducted using both the 
discriminatory and uniform pricing rules to compare the two 
alternatives.  The experimental language used is in 
Appendix D. 
Table 1.   Experiment Structure 
 
C. EXPERIMENTS 
Before each of the three different treatments, 
practice rounds are conducted to ensure subjects understand 
the layout and the goal of the scenario.  The practice 
rounds show the subjects every possible outcome.  
1. Monetary Cash Bid Only 
In the initial cash bid only experiment, subjects are 
one of a hundred employees at Firm A.  Just as described 
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above, Firm B offers a salary amount, and the subject must 
submit a bid to Firm A.  Based on the salary requests 
submitted, those employees who submitted the 50 lowest bids 
are kept with Firm A.  The 50 highest requests are laid off 
and employed at Firm B. 
2. Cash Bid Plus Independent NMIs 
Very similar to the purely monetary cash bid, now Firm 
A offers two generic NMIs.  Firm B still only provides a 
monetary salary if laid off from Firm A, the subject’s 
reservation wage.  The two NMIs are listed and are given a 
value and a cost.  The value provided is the amount the 
individual values the NMI.  The cost is the amount it costs 
for Firm A to provide that NMI.  If the subject values the 
NMI at more than cost, it should be selected.  Subjects are 
able to select neither, one or both NMIs should they so 
choose; the values and costs are purely additive. 
3. Cash Bid Plus Combinatorial NMIs 
This scenario is identical to the previous scenario, 
except now the NMI values are interdependent, in that NMI 1 
by itself is valued by the amount presented and NMI 2 by 
itself is valued by the amount presented.  However, when 
NMI 1 and NMI 2 are selected together, their values may be 
sub-additive, additive, or super-additive.  Subjects are 
told their value for the NMIs in combination as well as the 
“stand alone” value of each NMI.  Unlike NMI values, the 
NMI costs remain additive in this treatment.  
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D. OPTIMAL COMBINATIONS OF NMIS 
For every round that included NMIs, rounds 6-25 in 
this case, there are four options each subject can choose: 
1. No NMIs 
2. NMI 1 only 
3. NMI 2 only 
4. NMI 1 and 2 together 
In each case, the subject should select the NMI option that 
creates the most surplus value (total value minus total 
cost).  When purely additive, if NMI 1 and 2 are each 
valued less than the associated cost to provide, then the 
optimal choice is to not select any NMIs.  On the other 
hand, if NMI 1 and NMI 2 are each valued at greater than 
the associated cost, it is optimal for the individual to 
select both.  The same concept works for the NMIs 
individually as well. 
The decision process is more complicated for NMIs with 
combinatorial values.  One must look at each combination 
individually and determine the greatest surplus achieved.  
There may be instances when both NMIs have values that 
exceed costs, but it is optimal to only select one of the 
two NMIs (because they are substitutes); similarly there 
may be times when neither NMI has a value that exceeds cost 
independently, but it is optimal to select both in 
combination (because they are complements). 
1. Combinatorial NMI Values Under Bid-Method CRAM 
Since the CRAM may allocate individuals various 
combinations of NMIs, it is important to evaluate if the 
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mechanism (and/or each individual participating in the 
mechanism) appropriately incorporates and adjusts for the 
presence of super- and sub-additive NMI values.  
Inefficient separation and retention errors can occur as a 
result of adding individual NMI values vice using the 
combinatorial values. 
Table 2.   Illustration of Problem Scenarios and  
Non-Problem Scenarios When Assuming  
Additive Valuations (From Ellis, 2009) 
 
Table 2 presents example scenarios of super- and sub-
additive NMI values and how each could potentially create a 
problem for CRAM implementation via the bid-method.  The 
next section will explain how the menu-method CRAM can 
potentially correct these problems. 
The CRAM process illustrated in Table 2 is that of the 
uniform-price bid-method CRAM variation.  It is also 
assumed in the table that the bidder in question submits 
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his true reservation value as the cash bid and his true NMI 
value in bidding for each NMI.  Note that this would, in 
fact, be the optimal bidding strategy if NMI values were 
additive. 
Columns two through six represent the minimum cash to 
retain (which is equal to the reservation value as well as 
the cash bid), the values for NMI A and B, respectively 
(which, again, is also the assumed bids for NMI A and NMI 
B), the values of NMI A and B combined and the cost to 
provide each NMI.  Column seven represents the assumed cost 
to retain if the mechanism treated NMI values as additive; 
minimum cash to retain minus the value of NMI A and NMI B 
independently plus the cost of NMI A and NMI B.  Column 
eight represents the actual cost to retain using the true 
combinatorial NMI values; minimum cash to retain minus the 
value of both NMI A and NMI B plus the cost of NMI A and 
NMI B.  Column nine and ten represent the hypothetical 
cutoff retention cost for the scenario and the cash 
incentive received; the cutoff cost to retain minus the 
cost of the received NMIs, respectively.  The last three 
columns note if the individual was offered retention and if 
they were willing to retain, if the two columns do not 
match then there was a problem. 
Note that, in all nine scenarios, the bidder in 
question submits a cash bid of 40 and a bid of 10 for each 
NMI.  Because the cost of each NMI is less than the bid of 
10 in all scenarios, the bidder will be allocated both NMIs 




NMI values as strictly additive, in each scenario the total 
value of NMIs received will be assumed (incorrectly) to be 
equal to 20. 
The first three scenarios in Table 2 illustrate super-
additive NMIs; scenarios 1 and 3 are not problematic since 
those who wish to be retained are offered retention and 
those who do not want to be retained are not offered 
retention.  Scenario 2, however, demonstrates problems 
where assuming additive NMI values in the bid-method CRAM 
results in an individual not being offered retention.  The 
additive cost to retain was 36 and the actual cost to 
retain was 26, which is under the cutoff cost to retain of 
30.  The individual wanted to and could have been retained 
if the values of NMIs were properly calculated.  
Additionally, the military service would have been better 
off and the bidder would have gained value if he or she was 
retained.  This is a case of inefficient separation, 
because an individual was separated when they should have 
been retained. 
The next six scenarios in Table 2 are sub-additive and 
demonstrate potential problems when use additive NMIs vice 
the combinatorial values.  Scenarios 4, 6, 7, and 9 produce 
no problems; those who want to be retained are offered 
retention and those who do not, are not offered retention.  
Scenario 5 and 8 both represent potential problems due to 
adding individual NMI values vice using the true 
combinatorial values.  Scenario 5 results in the individual 
being offered retention; however, the individual is not 
better off and should not want to be retained at the amount 
offered.  In this case, it would be beneficial for the 
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individual to only select one NMI, resulting in gained 
value.  Scenario 8 is problematic because the bidder is 
offered retention using the additive NMI values; however, 
the bidder would not want to be retained using the 
combinatorial NMI values.  These scenarios result in 
inefficient retention errors, because an individual was 
retained when they should not have been.60 
2. Combinatorial NMI Values Under Menu-Method CRAM 
The menu-method CRAM can correct the three problem 
scenarios mentioned in Table 2.  Instead of individually 
bidding for each NMI and then subtracting the original 
“cash” only bid request.  The menu-method allows a bidder 
to select all the NMIs which are of value (none, one, all, 
or any combination) and then the bidder submits a single 
bid request which includes the monetary accounting for the 
NMI values.  In other words, assuming bidders receive all 
the requested NMIs what additional cash is requested?  The 
total cost of the individual would be the requested cash 
plus the cost of the requested NMIs.  The research 
hypothesizes that subjects will select combinations of NMIs 
which create the greatest delta between value and cost. 
E. OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGIES 
After selecting the desired combinations of NMIs, the 
subjects must submit a salary request.  Subjects have no 
preference between working for Firm A or B, only that their 
compensation is maximized.  Again, the objective is to 
                     
60 Jason B. Ellis, "Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary 
Incentives: Motivating and Implementing the Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanism," (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 
45-47. 
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maximize personal compensation.  The discriminatory and 
uniform auction mechanisms are similar but they have 
different bidding strategies. 
1. Discriminatory-Price Auction 
Recall that a discriminatory auction is the multiple-
winner generalization of the first-price auction.  In the 
experiment, those who submit the 50 lowest total cost bids 
are retained by Firm A and are paid the salary they each 
individually requested, assuming no NMIs are offered; those 
who submit the 50 highest total cost bids are laid off from 
Firm A and immediately work for Firm B at the amount 
previously offered. 
The subject must look at Firm B’s offer, which becomes 
the subject’s reservation wage, and then enter a salary 
request to Firm A.  As previously discussed in Chapter III, 
if an individual was to bid truthfully in a discriminatory 
auction, he or she would not maximize their expected 
surplus value.  Therefore, the optimal bidding strategy is 
to look at Firm B’s offer and bid higher in relation to the 
expected range of offers. 
2. Uniform-Price Auction 
Unlike a discriminatory auction, in a uniform auction 
it is now in the best interest of the individual to bid 
truthfully.  The optimal bidding strategy is to look at 
Firm B’s offer, one’s reservation wage, and then choose a 
salary request equal to the reservation wage (assuming no 
NMIs are offered). 
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3. Incorporating NMI Value 
Now that the optimal salary request without NMIs has 
been discussed, the subject must incorporate the value of 
the NMIs selected.  The individual will always know the NMI 
value.  Therefore, the individual should always take the 
cash only salary request and subtract the value of the 
selected NMIs.  This adjusted cash value is the optimal bid 
for each subject. 
F. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 
In Chapter IV, design considerations were discussed.  
They were procedural regularity, motivation, unbiasedness, 
calibration, and design parallelism.  The experiment layout 
and design for this thesis drew heavily from Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) research conducted by William J. 
Norton in 2007.  He designed a hypothetical experiment 
based on very similar concepts and ensured it met the key 
design considerations.  Since then, other researchers have 
conducted experiments on this subject using the same style.  
By keeping the format and language similar and only 
changing key aspects provides the ability to compare data 
from previous experiments. 
For this research, procedural regularity was 
maintained by strictly following the detailed instructions 
for each session.  Motivation was achieved by providing an 
actual cash award at the end of the experiment based on 
choices made throughout the session.  Unbiasedness was 
addressed by creating a general experimental context and 
specifically choosing language in the instructions and 
actual experiment that would not influence the subjects 
toward biased responses.  Calibration can be ensured by 
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evaluating the responses and determining if any responses 
were out of the ordinary.  If responses appeared to be 
rational and logical, then the experiment is calibrated to 
examine the objectives.  Lastly, design parallelism was 
achieved by making the situation as realistic as possible 
while also controlling many variables. 
G. HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses suggest that individuals should select the 
optimal NMI combination whether NMI values are additive or 
combinatorial.  If the proportion of optimal NMI selections 
under both value conditions were statistically the same, 
then it suggests that the ability of individuals to make 
rational utility-maximizing NMI selections is not reduced 
when dealing with combinatorial NMI values. 
Hypotheses propose that discriminatory and uniform 
bids will be statistically different.  Difference can be 
attributed to the optimal strategies of each method.  The 
uniform auction should result in individuals bidding near 
their reservation value with little reason to deviate.  A 
discriminatory auction should result in more variability 
among individuals’ bids as a result of the different 
optimal strategy.  Other hypotheses tests are used to 
evaluate the expected learning effects in the earlier 
trials compared to the later trials. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The experiment design focuses on determining if 
individuals make rational choices when dealing with 
combinations of NMIs.  Do individuals figure out the 
optimal bidding strategy when using a uniform or 
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discriminatory auction mechanism?  If an individual does 
find the optimal bidding strategy, do they then 
appropriately adjust their bid based on the NMIs selected.  
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VI. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter V explained how the uniform-price and 
discriminatory-price CRAM variations operate in the 
presence of combinatorial NMI values.  In the experiment, 
subjects were offered a salary from Firm B and in response 
they had to select NMIs, if offered, and submit a salary 
request to Firm A.  The subjects’ only goal was to maximize 
their personal compensation.  This chapter discusses the 
sample and the results of the salary requests. 
B. SAMPLE 
The experiment was conducted using 51 participants 
from NPS.  There were a total of three sessions; 4 February 
2010 (1300-1500), 5 February (1200-1400), and 5 February 
(1500-1700).  The sessions were conducted in a NPS computer 
lab with 18 desktop computers, 17 were operational.  Each 
of the three sessions had maximum participation, 17 
subjects for 17 computers.  Each subject participated in 30 
trials, thereby giving 1530 potential observations.  The 
first session, 4 February at 1300, used a uniform auction 
mechanism to evaluate NMI selection.  The last two 
sessions, 5 February at 1200 and 1500, used discriminatory 
auction mechanisms. 
Due to data input errors and other factors, two of the 
51 participants gave unusable data resulting in 1470 total 
observations from 49 individuals.  Four other participants 
appeared to irrationally select NMIs, either all of them or 
none of them.  The participants might not have understood 
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the concept of NMIs or were not taking the effort to 
specifically select the optimal combinations of NMIs.  
Their NMI responses (or lack of responses) were not 
included in the NMI analysis; however, their bid request 
was included in the analysis.61  The four participants 
appear to have understood the bidding aspect of the 
experiment just not the NMI part.  As a result, there were 
1350 observations for NMI analysis.   
Of the 1470 observations for the bid analysis, two 
bids from the same participant were well over the 
reasonable amount and were removed from the sample.62  The 
participant might have been trying to test the program and 
figure out how it worked.  Therefore, there were 1468 
observations for the bid analysis.  Notes of the sessions 
are located in Appendix E. 
The largest demographic group represented was male 
military officers.  Males represented 84 percent of the 
sample and females represented 16 percent as shown in 
Figure 16.  Figure 17 shows that the rank of O3 represented 
56 percent of the sample, with the rank of O4 at 29 
percent.  The ranks of O1, O2, and O5 were not highly 
represented.  The Navy had the largest representation at 61 




                     
61 Position 1 on 2/4 at 1300, Position 7 on 2/4 at 1300, Position 5 
on 2/5 at 1200, and Position 5 on 2/5 at 1500 were not included in the 
NMI analysis.  
62 Position 5 on 2/5 at 1200, rounds 3 and 23 were not included in 
the bid analysis. 
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United States (U.S.) services were represented less, 
between 17 percent and 6 percent.  One civilian 
participated in the experiment.  Figure 19 shows a 
reasonable spread over years of military service within the 
sample.  The main categories of less than or equal to five 
years, ten years, fifteen years, and twenty years was 
generally represented by around 20 to 30 percent of the 
sample.   
 
Figure 16.   Gender Representation in Sample 
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Figure 17.   Rank Representation in Sample 
 
Figure 18.   Service Representation in Sample 
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Figure 19.   Years of Experience in Sample 
C. NMI RESULTS 
Out of the 1350 NMI observations, 900 included NMIs.  
In half (450) of the NMI observations, NMI values were 
purely additive, while the other half (450) included 
combinatorial values.  The selected NMIs, by themselves, 
have little meaning.  Only by calculating the optimal NMI 
combination for each trial and comparing it to the 
combination actually selected can meaningful data be 
evaluated. 
1. Additive NMI Rounds 
Did individuals select the combination of NMIs which 
created the greatest value (value - cost) when the values 
were additive?  Yes, Figure 20 illustrates that 74 percent 
of the time individuals selected the optimal NMI 
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combination when the values were purely additive.  There 
was a significant learning effect witnessed in the way 
individuals selected NMIs from the earlier rounds to the 
later rounds.  Figure 21 shows that 67 percent of the 
subjects initially selected the optimal NMI combination; 
later in the experiment, using the exact same auction 
mechanism, 81 percent of the subjects selected the optimal 
NMI combinations. 
 
Figure 20.   Percent of Individuals Who Selected the 






Figure 21.   Learning Effect in Choosing the Optimal NMI 
Combinations – Additive Only 
2. Combinatorial NMI Rounds 
Did individuals select the combination of NMIs which 
created the greatest value (value – cost) when NMI values 
were combinatorial?  In other words, did individuals look 
at the combinatorial value of the two NMIs to determine the 
greatest value?  Yes, individuals did generally select the 
optimal combinations.  Figure 22 illustrates that 70 
percent of the observations selected the NMI combinations 
with the greatest value.  Again, there was a learning 
effect seen throughout the progression of the experiment, 
which is shown in Figure 23.  In the earlier combinatorial 
rounds, 67 percent of the observations selected the optimal 




Figure 22.   Percent of Observations with the Optimal NMI 
Combinations: Combinatorial NMI Values 
 
Figure 23.   Learning Effect in Choosing the Optimal NMI 
Combinations – Combinatorial NMI Values 
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a. Did Individuals Ignore the Combinatorial 
Effects?  
No, for the most part individuals did observe and 
the super-additive and sub-additive values for 
combinatorial NMIs.  Figure 24 shows that only six percent 
of the observations selected NMIs which would have been 
optimal if NMI values were additive, but which were not 
optimal given the combinatorial values; 94 percent of the 
participants noticed combinatorial effects and selected the 
optimal NMI combination based on the combinatorial values, 
vice looking at the two NMIs individually and simply adding 
their individual values.  
 
Figure 24.   Ignored Combinatorial Effects 
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b. Did the Complexity of Combinatorial Values 
Result in Non-Optimal Choices? 
Out of the 450 experimental rounds with 
combinatorial NMI values, 159 were considered “complex” 
choices.  A complex choice is defined as one in which a NMI 
combination that is not optimal with additive NMI values 
becomes optimal with combinatorial NMI values, or vice a 
versa.  In other words, individuals generally saw the 
created value (or de-value) in NMI combinations and 
purposely selected the optimum combination.  Figure 25 
shows that 66 percent of the complex choices were selected 
optimally, suggesting that individuals do react rationally 
to combinations of NMIs. 
 
Figure 25.   Selected the Optimal NMI Combination During 
a Complex Decision 
 87
3. Comparing the Additive and Combinatorial Rounds 
It appears that the majority of the participants 
understood the concept of choosing the NMI combinations 
which created the greatest value.  Recall, that at no time 
during the instructions were subjects told how they should 
select NMIs, only how their choices would affect (a) their 
likelihood of being retained by Firm A and (b) the value of 
their total compensation if retained.  Individuals had to 
figure out that the greatest value was achieved by creating 
the greatest positive delta between value and cost.  It 
appears that 74 percent of the observations during the 
additive rounds were able to select the greatest value; 
yet, in the combinatorial rounds the number dropped to 70 
percent.  The slight dip could be attributed to 
participants learning how to use NMIs to their advantage. 
a. Combined Learning Effects 
As previously mentioned, there appears to be a 
significant learning effect noticed in how individuals 
selected NMIs throughout the experiment.  Figure 26 shows 
the learning effect trend.  Initially optimal NMI selection 
was around 63 percent; it steadily increased to 77 percent 
by round 25.  Since the trend did not level off by round 
25, it appears that a greater number of individuals would 
select optimal combinations of NMIs if either the 
experiment was to progress or if individuals were given 
more detailed instructions on how to pick NMI combinations.   
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Figure 26.   Learning Effects for NMI  
Selection: Rounds 6-25 
b. Did Prior Experience With Similar Experiments 
Influence Results? 
There were 13 participants, out of 49, who had 
experience with this type of experiment because of outside 
class room instruction or participation in another similar 
experiment.  A comparison of those with known prior 
experience and those with no known prior experience was 
conducted to see if it influenced NMI selection.  Results 
suggest that those with prior experience were not more 
likely to select the optimal NMI combination compared to 
those with no prior experience.  Those with prior known 
experience and those without prior known experience 
performed almost identically. 
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4. Hypothesis Tests 
a. Additive Trials 
The first hypothesis test examines if the earlier 
additive trials were statistically different from the later 
additive trials.  The null hypothesis is that trials 6-10 
are statistically the same as trials 21-25 with a 
significance level of 0.05. 
Ho: P6-10 – P21-25 = 0 
Ha: P6-10 – P21-25 ≠ 0 
Where P6-10 is the probability of selecting the 
optimal NMI combination in trials 6-10 and P21-25 is the 
probability of selecting the optimal NMI combination in 
trials 21-25.  The calculated p-value is 0.0004 and less 
than the alpha (0.05); therefore, we reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative.  The earlier 
additive rounds are statistically different from the later 
additive rounds.  The likely reason for the large change 
from the earlier to later rounds can be attributed to the 
significant learning effect. 
b. Combinatorial Trials 
The second hypothesis test examines if the 
earlier combinatorial trials were statistically different 
from the later combinatorial trials.  The null hypothesis 
is that trials 11-15 are statistically the same as trials 
16-20 with a significance level of 0.05. 
Ho: P11-15 – P16-20 = 0 
Ha: P11-15 – P16-20 ≠ 0 
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Where P11-15 is the probability of selecting the 
optimal NMI combination in trials 11-15 and P16-20 is the 
probability of selecting the optimal NMI combination in 
trials 16-20.  The calculated p-value is 0.1811 and greater 
than the alpha (0.05); therefore, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis.  The earlier combinatorial rounds and 
later combinatorial rounds are statistically the same. 
c. Comparing Additive and Combinatorial 
The third hypothesis test examines if the 
additive trials were statistically different from the 
combinatorial trials.  The null hypothesis is that the 
additive trials are statistically the same as the 
combinatorial trials with a significance level of 0.05. 
Ho: Pa – Pc = 0 
Ha: Pa – Pc ≠ 0 
Where Pa is the probability of selecting the optimal NMI 
combination in the additive trials and Pc is the probability 
of selecting the optimal NMI combination in the 
combinatorial trials.  The calculated p-value is 0.1815 and 
greater than the alpha (0.05); therefore, we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis.  The additive trials and the 
combinatorial trials are statistically the same. 
D. BID RESULTS 
The next part of the experiment asked participants to 
submit a bid to Firm A with only one goal:  to maximize the 
total value of their compensation.  By looking at the 
respective bids, we can evaluate how individuals bid in the 
discriminatory or uniform auction formats, how individuals 
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reacted to NMIs with combinatorial values, what type of 
problems individuals encountered, and the potential cost 
savings. 
Firm B’s salary offers were randomly generated and 
were different for each individual for each round.  Similar 
to the NMIs by themselves, the individual bids have little 
meaning by themselves.  A meaningful metric is the actual 
bid as a percentage of the optimal bid for each round.  
Recall from Chapter III that the optimal bidding strategy 
for a uniform, second-price auction is to bid equal to 
one’s reservation wage.  In this experiment, the 
individual’s optimal bid under uniform pricing is either 
the offer from Firm B (if no NMIs were offered or none were 
selected) or Firm B’s offer minus the combined value of 
selected NMIs.  However, in a discriminatory, first-price 
auction it is optimal to bid above one’s reservation wage 
(or above one’s reservation wage minus the value of 
selected NMIs).  Thus, the calculations for the following 
analysis comparing submitted bid request to the optimal 
request have already been adjusted for the different 
optimal bidding strategies under the two different pricing 
rules. 
Using the metric of actual over optimal creates an 
easy measure to see how close subjects came to bidding 
optimally.  A value of 100 percent means that the subjects 
were bidding on average optimally.  A value less than or 
greater than 100 percent means that subjects were bidding 
on average below or above the optimal value, respectively.  
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1. Discriminatory Auction 
a. Submitted Bid Request vs. Optimal Bid Requests 
Figure 27 illustrates how closely individuals bid 
relative to the optimal bid; 100 percent represents an 
optimal bid.  It appears that in the initial rounds 
subjects were slightly over bidding but adjusted their 
bidding strategy in the later rounds.  Also, there was a 
noticeable dip in the first five combinatorial rounds; this 
could reflect learning as participants determine how to 
optimally reduce their bid in relation to the combined 
value of the NMIs chosen.  Important to note, the overall 
average was 99.6 percent meaning that for all 30 trials 
individuals on average bid optimally.  
The rounds which were classified as complex 
appeared to have induced lower than optimal bidding.  
Interesting to note is that those with experience tended to 
under bid in the discriminatory auction.  This might be due 
to the fact that prior experience was primarily with 
uniform auction mechanisms.  As mentioned earlier, in a 
uniform-price auction it is optimal to bid the reservation 
wage (Firm B’s offer) minus the combined value of any NMIs 
selected, but in a discriminatory auction it is optimal to 
bid above this amount.  
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Figure 27.   Bid Request vs. Optimal Request: 
Discriminatory 
Figure 28 illustrates the spread of 
discriminatory bids as ratio of actual bid to optimal bid.  
Most bids were close to the optimal bid as reflected by a 
ratio of one; however, it appears the bidding never 
stabilizes to one.   
 
Figure 28.   The Spread of Discriminatory Bids 
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b. Hypothesis Tests 
Additional hypothesis tests examine if the 
earlier trials were statistically different from the later 
trials; hypothesis tests were conducted for the monetary, 
additive, and combinatorial discriminatory-price rounds.  
The null hypotheses are that the earlier five trials are 
statistically the same as the later five trials using the 
same treatment.  The significance level of 0.05 was used to 
accept or reject the null hypothesis.  The letter D in the 
notation below represents the average for the 
discriminatory trials annotated in subtext. 
Monetary Trials: 
Ho: D1-5 – D26-30 = 0 
Ha: D1-5 – D26-30 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.0396 which is less 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative:  the means of the 
earlier and later trials are statistically different, 
indicating some learning in the monetary discriminatory 
price auction trials. 
Additive Trials: 
Ho: D6-10 – D21-25 = 0 
Ha: D6-10 – D21-25 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.3374 which is greater 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, the means of the first five additive NMI 
value trials and the last five additive trials were 
statistically the same. 
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Combinatorial Trials: 
Ho: D11-15 – D16-20 = 0 
Ha: D11-15 – D16-20 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.0755 which is greater 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, the means of first five combinatorial NMI 
value trials and the second five trials are statistically 
the same. 
c. Actual Outcome vs. Optimal Outcome 
After the bids were submitted and individuals 
were either retained by Firm A or let go to Firm B, we can 
analyze how close the actual results are to the best case 
scenario (assuming everyone bid optimally) in terms of 
employee value and employer cost.  As shown in Figure 29, 
the actual outcomes in the rounds with NMIs (rounds 6 – 25) 
appear to be closer to 100 percent, which is optimal, than 
the rounds with purely monetary bonuses.  Overall, however, 
value and cost outcomes appear to be approximately 95 
percent of the optimal outcome. 
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Figure 29.   Actual Outcome vs. Optimal Outcome: 
Discriminatory 
d. Value vs. Cost 
When comparing the ratios of individual value and 
cost to retain, the discriminatory-price CRAM observations 
generated 94.8 percent of the employee value achieved with 
perfectly optimal bidder behavior, while incurring 95.1 
percent of the employer cost associated with such optimal 
behavior.  While the discriminatory auction was technically 
cheaper because the cost ratio was less than 100 percent, 
the value was lower as well meaning individuals could have 
gained more value.  
e. Retention Errors Observed 
If subjects make poor NMI choices or poor cash 
bid submissions, there is the potential for a retention 
error.  The error is not due to the auction mechanism 
design, it is due to the decision made by an individual in 
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a particular auction round.  There are three specific 
errors that are interesting to consider. 
Table 3.   Retention Errors: Discriminatory 
Retention Errors
Discriminatory
Firm B's Offer Firm A Cutoff
Inefficient Retention 100,000 80,000
Bid Result
Optimal bid * 110,000 over cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and go to Firm B
Equiviant to optimal >80,000 over cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and go to Firm B
Error, not optimal <80,000 under cutoff, therefore get bid amount and stay with Firm A
Firm B's Offer Firm A Cutoff
Inefficient Separation 80,000 100,000
Bid Result
Optimal bid * 90,000 under cutoff, therefore get 90,000 and stay with Firm A
Equiviant to optimal <100,000 under cutoff, therefore get bid amount and stay with Firm A
Error, not optimal >100,000 over cutoff, therefore get 80,000 and go to Firm B
Involuntary Retention
Optimal outcome Value received in either Firm A or B was optimal in relation to bid
Error, not optimal Stayed with Firm A and total value received is less than Frim B's offer
*Adjusted for discriminatory auctiona and Includeds costs for selected NMIs  
Table 3 provides an example of each type of 
error.  For simplicity of illustration, the table 
illustrates each type of error within a monetary-incentive 
retention auction; however, these errors are also factors 
(even more so) in the presence of NMI offerings. 
The first type of error is one of inefficient 
retention.  An inefficient retention error occurs when an 
individual is retained by Firm A but was not one of the 50 
least expensive employees to retain.  The individual’s 
minimum cost to retain (factoring in his reservation wage 
as well as his NMI values, if NMIs are offered) was among 
the top half of the employees bidding, meaning some other 
employee with a lower true cost to retain was separated.  
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This lower-cost-but-separated employee would have been 
willing to retain for a compensation package of lower cost 
than what was offered to the inefficiently retained 
employee, reducing the overall cost to Firm A. 
The second type of error is an inefficient 
separation error.  This is seen when an individual’s true 
minimum cost to retain was among the 50 lowest, but he was 
nonetheless separated to Firm B.  If a low cost individual 
overbids the optimal salary request, for example, and 
consequently exceeds Firm A’s cutoff, he would be separated 
to Firm B, and some other employee with a higher true 
minimum cost to retain would take his place at Firm A.  As 
with inefficient retention, inefficient separation means 
that there is a lower-cost-but-separated employee who would 
have been willing to retain for a compensation package of 
lower cost than what was offered to an inefficiently 
retained employee.  Both inefficient retention and 
inefficient separation are errors which increase Firm A’s 
cost (although perhaps only marginally). 
Whereas the first two errors were defined from 
the perspective of the employer (Firm A), the third type of 
error, involuntary retention, is defined from the 
perspective of the employee.  An employee is involuntarily 
retained whenever he is retained by Firm A and receives a 
compensation package whose total value is less than his 
reservation value (Firm B offer).  In the military 
reenlistment context, an involuntary retention would refer 
to a situation in which a service member is offered 
reenlistment with a particular compensation package based 
on his NMI choices and cash bid but, in hindsight, the 
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service member decides he would rather separate instead.  
Such errors are obviously problematic from a force-
management perspective, because too many such errors might 
cause the military service to undershoot its retention 
goals.  Note that most cases of involuntary retention are 
also cases of inefficient cases, but this is not always the 
case.  In particular, a service member could be retained 
involuntarily but not inefficiently, and vice versa. 
Figure 30 illustrates the frequency of each type 
of retention error in the discriminatory-price CRAM 
observations.  In rounds one through five the number of 
errors were slightly higher than in the later rounds.  This 
could be attributed to individuals learning how the 
mechanism works, in the later rounds errors appeared to 
decrease slightly.  Inefficient retentions and separations 
also seem to track together, suggesting that individuals 
bid inappropriately over and under the cutoff value almost 
equally.  Rounds with NMIs characterized as complex choices 
do not have a higher error rate.  Those individuals with 
past auction mechanism experience appear to have 
essentially the same error rates as the rest of the sample.  
As mentioned earlier this is likely reflects that most of 
the individuals with experience only had experience with 
second-price (uniform) price auctions, which does not 
provide experience with discriminatory price auctions. 
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Figure 30.   Retention Errors: Discriminatory 
f. Cost Savings as a Result of Using NMIs 
The discriminatory-price CRAM with additive-value 
or combinatorial-value NMIs provided a potential savings of 
16 percent over a purely monetary auction mechanism.  Cost 
savings is solely attributed to the chosen NMIs, and it is 
directly related to the value gained verses the cost of the 
NMIs received.  While there was a cost savings of 16 percent, 
there was also less value gained by the individuals. 
It should also be noted that the cost of the NMIs 
in this experiment generally averaged around ten percent in 
relation to the outside salary offer (reservation value).  
Therefore, even if all individuals chose the optimal 
combinations of NMIs, the savings due to incorporating NMIs 
would not significantly increase given the costs and values 
used in this experiment.  This information is provided to 
show that the potential cost savings from incorporating 
NMIs could be even greater, as survey data indicates that 
many individuals value NMIs very highly relative to cash 
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retention incentives (with some NMI values even more than 
100 percent of the required cash retention incentive). 
2. Uniform Auction 
a. Submitted Bid Request vs. Optimal Bid Requests 
Figure 31 shows that on average individuals in 
the first ten rounds bid over the optimal amount, where the 
optimal bid is the actual reservation price.  As the 
experiment progressed, overbidding decreased to just over 
100 percent of the optimal bid.  The overall average was 
104.5 percent meaning that individuals were consistently 
over bidding throughout all the trials.  The rounds that 
were considered to be complex choices appear to be no 
different than the other rounds.  Those with experience bid 
differently in the uniform price auctions than those 
without experience.  Shown in the last column in Figure 30, 
individuals with known experience bid consistently 
optimally, 100 percent of the optimal bid.    
 
Figure 31.   Bid Request vs. Optimal Request: Uniform  
 102
Figure 32 illustrates the spread of uniform price 
bids as a ratio of actual vs. optimal bid.  Unlike the 
discriminatory trials, the uniform bidders do appear to 
level off at one, reflecting a large number of optimal 
bids.  This suggests that many participants were 
continuously bidding optimally. 
 
Figure 32.   The Spread of Uniform Bids 
b. Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis tests to examine if the earlier trials 
were statistically different from the later trials were 
conducted for the uniform price monetary, additive, and 
combinatorial rounds.  The null hypotheses are that the 
earlier five trials are statistically the same as the later 
five trials using the same treatment.  The significance 
level of 0.05 was used to accept or reject the null 
hypothesis.  The letter U in the notation below represents 





Ho: U1-5 – U26-30 = 0 
Ha: U1-5 – U26-30 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.3654 which is greater 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis; the mean of the first five trials in the 
monetary uniform price auction is statistically the same as 
the mean of the last five trials. 
Additive Trials: 
Ho: U6-10 – U21-25 = 0 
Ha: U6-10 – U21-25 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.0070 which is less 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative.  The means from the 
first five trials are statistically different than the 
means for the later five trials for additive NMI values in 
the uniform price auction.  This indicates some learning 
took place between the early and later bidding rounds. 
Combinatorial Trials: 
Ho: U11-15 – U16-20 = 0 
Ha: U11-15 – U16-20 ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.1395 which is greater 
than the alpha (0.05).  As a result we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis; in the uniform price auction, the means of 
the first five combinatorial NMI value trials and the 
second five trials are statistically the same. 
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c. Actual Outcomes vs. Optimal Outcomes 
Once the bids were submitted and individuals were 
distributed to their respective firms, we can compare the 
actual outcomes and optimal outcomes in terms of employee 
value and employer cost, as shown in Figure 33.  The 
results show that the actual outcomes are consistently 99 
percent of the optimal value and cost outcomes throughout 
the experiment.  This suggests that the uniform price CRAM 
mechanism produces outcomes very close to the optimum 
solution. 
 
Figure 33.   Actual Outcome vs. Optimal Outcome: Uniform 
d. Value vs. Cost 
When comparing the value vs. cost in the uniform 
price auction, the value was 98.6 percent and cost was 99.0 
percent of the value and cost in the optimal solutions, 
respectively.  The results indicate that individuals 
typically selected the optimal NMI combinations and optimal  
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monetary bid, resulting in costs which were near optimal; 
as a result, individuals capture most of the potential 
value available. 
e. Retention Errors Observed 
Mentioned earlier, retention errors are observed 
when individuals make sub-optimal NMI choices or cash bid 
decisions.  Very similar to the discriminatory auction, the 
uniform auction has the same types of errors.  Table 4 is 
identical to Table 3 shown for the discriminatory; however, 
it reflects a uniform-price auction.  The most important 
thing to note is that now if a participant under or over 
bids but stays with Firm A, the bidder receives the cutoff 
value vice the bid submitted, affecting the impact of under 
or over bidding. 
Table 4.   Retention Errors: Uniform   
Retention Errors
Uniform
Firm B's Offer Firm A Cutoff
Inefficient Retention 100,000 80,000
Bid Result
Optimal bid * 100,000 over cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and go to Firm B
Equiviant to optimal >80,000 over cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and go to Firm B
Error, not optimal <80,000 under cutoff, therefore get 80,000 and stay with Firm A
Firm B's Offer Firm A Cutoff
Inefficient Separation 80,000 100,000
Bid Result
Optimal bid * 80,000 under cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and stay with Firm A
Equiviant to optimal <100,000 under cutoff, therefore get 100,000 and stay with Firm A
Error, not optimal >100,000 over cutoff, therefore get 80,000 and go to Firm B
Involuntary Retention
Optimal outcome Value received in either Firm A or B was optimal in relation to bid
Error, not optimal Stayed with Firm A and total value received is less than Frim B's offer
*Includeds costs for selected NMIs  
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Figure 34.   Retention Errors: Uniform 
There were fewer inefficient retention errors 
(higher cost individuals inefficiently retained by Firm A) 
observed in the uniform-price CRAM compared to the 
discriminatory CRAM.  Inefficient separation errors (lower 
cost individuals inefficiently separated to Firm B) 
appeared more prevalent in the additive rounds, as shown in 
Figure 34.  These errors occurred when individuals overbid 
their optimal value, by doing this they exceeded the cutoff 
for Firm A and received Firm B’s lower offer.  If they 
submitted a bid equal to their reservation wage, they would 
have been retained and given a higher salary.  In a uniform 
price auction, inefficient retention errors and involuntary 
retention errors won’t necessarily coincide but often do 
because of the Firm A’s cutoff value going to all retained 
employees (in fact, these errors will always coincide in 
the observations with monetary incentives alone).  Those 
with known experience never had a type one or an 
involuntary retention error. 
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f. Cost Savings as a Result of Using NMIs 
Using the uniform-price CRAM with additive-value 
and combinatorial-value NMIs resulted in a potential 
savings of two percent over the use of a purely monetary 
auction mechanism.  As stated earlier, cost savings is 
solely attributed to the NMIs chosen.  This experiment used 
NMIs which were valued on average at about ten percent of 
the reservation price provided; therefore, the potential 
cost savings within the experiment were relatively low.63  
In reality, individuals’ value for NMIs may become very 
significant in relation to the cash equivalent, resulting 
in more value gained and more cost savings. 
g. Was Participant Bidding Different Between 
the Discriminatory and Uniform Auctions? 
A hypothesis test was conducted comparing the 
bidding averages in both the discriminatory and uniform 
auctions.  The null hypothesis is the discriminatory and 
uniform means were statistically the same.  The 
significance level used is 0.05. 
Ho: D – U = 0 
Ha: D – U ≠ 0 
The calculated p-value is 0.0000 which is less 
than the alpha (0.05).  Therefore, we must conclude that 
the discriminatory- and uniform-price auction means are 
statistically different. 
                     
63 Random number generators were used to determine reservation prices 
(normally distributed; $50,000-250,000), NMI values (normally 
distributed; $0-$25,000), and NMI costs (function of NMI values, 
normally distributed; 0.25 – 1.25). 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A review of the NMI bids shows that individuals pick 
the optimal NMI combination 70 percent of the time.  There 
was also a significant learning effect from the earlier 
rounds to the later rounds of a similar treatment.  The 
bids submitted in both the discriminatory and uniform 
auctions suggest that individuals understand the value of 
NMIs and appropriately adjusted their bids. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The current SRB program has largely accomplished its 
objectives, enabling the military services to meet their 
retention goals, but its weaknesses are becoming more 
apparent.  The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM) has the potential to correct the known weaknesses and 
serve as a powerful future tool in shaping military manpower.  
The use of non-monetary incentives (NMIs) is a large 
component of the CRAM and potentially provides individuals 
with greater value while saving the military services money.  
Understanding how individuals view and select NMIs will 
undoubtedly be important for implementing a CRAM type SRB 
system. 
1. Primary Research Question Answered 
The findings in the research suggest individuals 
select the optimal NMIs about 70 percent of the time using 
the CRAM retention approach.  There was a significant 
learning effect observed in comparing the earlier and later 
rounds; in the later rounds, individuals selected the 
optimal NMI combinations 81 percent of the time.  
Independent NMIs, whose values were purely additive, were 
chosen correctly 74 percent of the time.  The combinatorial 
NMIs, with super- and sub-additive values, were selected 
correctly 70 percent of the time.  The results suggest that 
many people understood combinatorial NMIs and chose the 
combination which produced the greatest surplus (value – 
cost). 
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2. Secondary Research Questions Answered 
Individuals do appear to make rational decisions when 
faced with numerous NMI choices.  This experiment only 
looked at two NMIs, which resulted in only four potential 
NMI allocations.  Each individual had to look at the four 
possible combinations and select the one which created the 
greatest value.  Of the four options, individuals were 
consistently able to pick the best one.  It should be noted 
that by adding NMIs the choices increase exponentially.  
Three NMIs result in eight potential outcomes and five NMIs 
result in 32 potential outcomes.  With a greater number of 
choices, it may be challenging for individuals to make the 
optimal choice.  However, this research shows that most 
individuals will select combinations which at least 
approximate, if not equal, the optimal choice. 
When comparing the uniform and discriminatory-price 
CRAM variations, significant differences in bidding were 
noticed.  Those participating in the discriminatory price 
auction appeared to consistently underbid their optimal 
salary request, even with NMI combinations chosen, 
resulting in retention errors and reducing their earned 
value.  In the uniform price auctions, individuals appeared 
to bid closer to their optimal salary request, resulting in 
more optimal outcomes. 
More importantly, the results paralleled other 
combinatorial auction research.  Stephen Rassenti stated that: 
The experimental results suggest that: (a) the 
procedures of the mechanism are operational, 
i.e., motivated individuals can execute the 
required task with a minimum of instruction and 
training; (b) the extent of demand under 
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revelation by participant is not large, i.e., 
allocative efficiencies of 98-99 percent of the 
possible surplus seem to be achievable over time 
with experienced bidders.64 
The experiment conducted for this thesis produced 
similar results: participants were able to make rational and 
efficient decisions based on relatively limited instructions.  
Participants were only told how the mechanism operated, not 
optimal bidding strategies.  With the incorporation of NMIs, 
participants were still bidding rationally and creating 
efficiencies near 99 percent in a uniform-price combinatorial 
auction, which is similar to Rassenti’s results. 
3. Other Research Findings 
The ability to look at those with experience 
separately from those without prior experience resulted in 
significant findings.  Those participants with prior 
experience were typically experienced with the uniform 
price auction mechanism through classroom instruction or 
other presentations about the research.  The results of 
this knowledge were apparent in the uniform-price CRAM 
observations, when every experienced participant bid 
optimally.  However, when those experienced participants 
participated in a discriminatory price auction, they 
performed poorly because they used the wrong bidding 
strategy.  The important aspect of these findings is that 
those who were given some additional instructions, 
explaining how the systems works and the truth revealing 
nature of a uniform price auction, consistently performed 
                     
64 Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, and Robert L. Bulfin, (“A 
Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation,” Bell 
Journal of Economics, 12 (1982): 404-417. 
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optimally.  Building off of this knowledge, instructions 
play a key role in the success of using an auction 
mechanism in a real world setting. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY  
Introducing a uniform-price sealed-bid auction 
mechanism into the military SRB program would be an 
improvement and dramatic change from the current system.  
Further experiments are necessary before making a full or 
partial implementation. Building on past research, 
including this thesis, the next phase of experiments should 
begin to actually have participants bid against each other.  
All of the prior experiments, including this one, used a 
computer program and random numbers to determine the salary 
offers and the cutoff for Firm A; participants were 
competing against the computer.  Future experiments should 
have participants actually competing with their physical 
neighbors to see if expected results match the actual 
results. 
Another topic of interest is the instruction provided.  
Since those with experience bid consistently differently 
than those without experience, it would be important to 
conduct studies to see how a group would bid if they were 
told the optimal bidding strategy. 
The use of NMIs is a critical component to the CRAM 
and raises questions about the best way to present 
information to the bidders.  As the number of NMIs 
increases, the ability to find and make the optimal choice 
becomes increasing complex.  It is important to find the 
best way to present the NMI choices and a mechanism which 
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allows individuals to see all the various combinations 
allowing them to make the best decision. 
The ultimate goal would be to apply the CRAM to an 
actual group of military service members in competition for 
an actual bonus.  It is a large goal, but it is well worth 
the effort.  The military services would be at the leading 
edge of manpower utilization; efficiently using tax 
dollars, focused and precise force management, and 
including monetary and non-monetary incentives, all while 
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APPENDIX A.  REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 
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APPENDIX B.  REQUEST FOR VOLUNTEERS 
REQUEST FOR PAID VOLUNTEERS 
 
Fellow NPS Students, 
 
I am seeking paid volunteers to participate in a decision 
making experiment.  The experiment is in support of a 
thesis, investigating ways to improve military compensation 
and retention. 
 
What:  Participants will use a computer and input responses 
based on information provided.  Detailed instructions will 
be given and it will be conducted in a stress-free 
environment.  The total experiment will take less than 2 
hours.  Volunteers will get paid based on decisions made 
during the experiment; average earnings will be between 
$20-$30.   
 
When:  Feb 4 (Thur) @ 1300, or Feb 5 (Fri) @ 1200, or Feb 5 
(Fri) @ 1500 
 
Where:  NPS, Ingersoll computer lab (Ing-224) 
 
Who:  Open to all NPS Students 
 
Why:  To assist a fellow student with research and get paid 
 
How:  If you are interested, please e-mail me 
(kphahn@nps.edu).  Tell me what times you prefer and 
provide a 1st and 2nd choice incase a session becomes filled.  
I will respond to you, confirming your participation and 
time.   
 
Thank you for your time. 
 
Very Respectfully, 
Capt Kyle Hahn 
NPS Student 
Manpower Systems Analysis  
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APPENDIX C.  INSTRUCTIONS 
A. EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) 
MENU-STYLE / UNIFORM PRICING & DISCRIMINATORY PRICING 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment in labor 
market decision making. If you have not done so already, 
please complete the experiment participant registration 
form that should be on your computer screen. As noted on 
your screen, please do not click the “proceed” button until 
you are instructed to do so. 
We will start today with an initial instruction period 
that should take about 30 minutes.  There will also be 
several shorter additional instruction periods during the 
experiment. The actual experiment itself should take 
approximately 60 minutes, and the entire process should be 
complete no later than _____ as promised. 
You will be paid for your participation in cash at the 
end of the experiment.  Different participants may earn 
different amounts.  What you earn depends partly on the 
decisions you make and partly on certain probabilistic 
events that will be explained during these instructions. 
Although there are several of you participating in this 
experiment simultaneously, your earnings from the 
experiment will not depend on the decisions made by any of 
the other participants. This experiment does not involve 
any interaction between participants. 
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The entire experiment will take place through the 
computer terminals in front of you, and your primary 
actions will involve using the mouse to click on boxes or 
buttons and using the keyboard to enter numeric answers. It 
is important that you not talk or in any way try to 
communicate with or observe the actions of other 
participants during the experiment. 
As noted previously, we are starting with a somewhat 
lengthy instruction period.  During the instruction period, 
you will be given a complete description of the experiment 
and you will be introduced to the type of decisions you 
will be asked to make during the experiment.  If you have 
any questions during the instruction period, raise your 
hand and your question will be answered so that everyone 
can hear.  If any difficulties arise after the experiment 
has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come 
and assist you. 
The experiment itself will consist of 30 rounds. The 
instruction period will involve going through a practice 
round which is identical in structure to the experimental 
rounds.  As we go through the practice round, please do not 
type anything or click any buttons unless instructed to do 
so.  We will all go through the practice round together at 
the same pace. 
Has everybody completed filling out the participant 
registration form on your computer screen? Okay, please go 
ahead and use the computer mouse to click on the button 




PRACTICE ROUND – PRACTICE SURVEY A-F 
 
You should now all be looking at a screen that says 
“Scenario Background” at the top left.  As you can see, 
this screen contains an extensive description of the labor 
market scenario we are investigating in this experiment. 
During this practice round, I will read aloud all of the 
information that is written on your computer screen and you 
should read along. 
During the actual experiment, all of the descriptive 
information that you see on your screen will also be 
provided each round, although you do not need to re-read 
the information each round.  It is simply provided as a 
reference in case you would like to go back and review the 
scenario description. 
I will now begin reading the description on your 
computer screen. 
READ: Scenario Background – Salary Offer from Firm B 
All of you should have the value of $150,000 in the 
white box on your screen for this practice round.  During 
the actual experimental rounds, however, everybody will 
receive different annual salary offers from Firm B.  In 
addition, you will be given a different offer from Firm B 
in each of the 30 rounds of the experiment.  Now I will 
continue reading the description on your computer screen. 
READ: Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B – 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
Before continuing, let me further illustrate how your 
employer and salary will be determined using the chart we 
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have given you titled “Salary Survey to Determine Employer 
and Salary.” [Show and explain slide] 
READ: Your Salary Request to Firm A 
Please do not type anything in the box or click the 
“Submit” button at the bottom of the page yet.  During the 
experimental rounds, however, you will determine the annual 
salary that you would like to request from Firm A based on 
the information above, and you will type your request in 
the white box at the bottom of this page. During the 
experimental rounds, you will also be free to click the 
“Submit” button whenever you are satisfied with the salary 
request you have entered. 
For illustration purposes during this practice round, 
I would like each of you to type the amount $75,000 in the 
white box and then hit the enter key.  After you have done 
so, you may click on the “Submit” button with the mouse. 
 
PRACTICE ROUND OUTCOME – FIRM A 
 
You should now all be looking at a screen that says 
“Results” at the top left. This is the screen that you will 
see if your salary request was among the 50 lowest of the 
100 salary requests submitted, in which case you will be 
retained by Firm A. 
I will now read the description on your computer 
screen. 
READ: Results Retained by Firm A 
If you arrive at this screen during the experimental 
rounds, you will have completed your task for the round, 
however you must wait until everybody else has finished the 
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round before proceeding. It is very important that we all 
proceed through the experiment at the same pace, because 
there will be changes to the procedure in later rounds 
which I must explain to all of you at the same time when 
you all arrive at that point of the experiment. Because all 
participants must proceed to each successive experimental 
round at the same time, you will need to wait until I 
instruct you to do so before clicking the “Proceed” button. 
During this practice round, however, we will go back 
to the beginning to see what can happen if you submit a 
different salary request in the second salary survey.  
Therefore, please go ahead and click the “proceed” button 
now. 
 
PRACTICE ROUND OUTCOME – FIRM B 
 
What we have just reviewed is what will happen and 
what you will see if your salary request is among the 50 
lowest of the 100 salary requests submitted, in which case 
you will be retained by Firm A. We will now illustrate what 
happens if your salary request is among the 50 highest of 
the 100 salary requests submitted. 
Clicking on the “Proceed” button should have returned 
all of you to the original Practice Survey screen with the 
words “Scenario Background” at the top left.  All of the 
information and dollar values on this screen are identical 
to what we saw previously.  In particular, your salary 
offer from Firm B should once again be $150,000. 
Please now scroll to the bottom of this screen 
where it says: 
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What annual salary do you request from Firm A? 
To illustrate what happens if your salary request is 
among the 50 highest of the 100 salary requests submitted,  
I would like each of you to type the amount $175,000 in the 
white box and then hit the enter key.  After you have done 
so, you may click on the “Submit” button with the mouse. 
You should now all be looking at a screen that says 
“Results” at the top left. This is the screen that you will 
see if your salary request was among the highest 50 of the 
100 salary requests submitted, in which case you will not 
be retained by Firm A and will be employed by Firm B at the 
salary offered previously. 
I will now read the description on your computer 
screen. 
READ: Results Not Retained by Firm A - Distribution of 
Salary Requests to Firm A 
Please note that the lowest, highest, and 50th 
highest salary request figures here are identical to 
the ones shown previously. This is done for 
illustrative purposes only, however, so keep in mind 
that these figures will be change for you in each 
round of the experiment and will be different for each 
participant each round. 
Now I will continue reading the description on your 
computer screen. 
READ: Your Employer and Salary 
If you arrive at this screen during the experimental 
rounds, you will have completed your task for that round, 
however you must wait until everybody else has finished the 
round before proceeding. All participants will need to 
proceed to the next experimental round at the same time, 
 125
therefore you will need to wait until I instruct you to do 




Before we all click the “Proceed” button at the bottom 
of the screen to start the actual experimental rounds, are 
there any questions before we begin? 
Remember that, on the initial salary survey screen, 
you will determine the annual salary that you would like to 
request from Firm A based on the information given, and you 
will then type your request in the white box at the bottom 
of this page. You will be free to click the “Submit” button 
whenever you are satisfied with the salary request you have 
entered. When you reach the “Results” screen, however, 
please do not click the “Proceed” button until instructed 
to do so. 
Please click the “proceed” button and begin round 1 of 
the experiment. Thank you. 
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APPENDIX D.  EXPERIMENTS 
A. UNIFORM 
1. Cash Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A. 
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B. 
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. 
Your only goal is to maximize the value of your annual compensation. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately. 
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A. 
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately.  
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off. 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B. 
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B  
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound. 
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence on his/her future salary at Firm A.  
Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each of its retained employees will be determined using a survey.  
"Firm A is asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in order 
to remain with Firm A." 
Firm A will then retain the 50 of its 100 employees who submitted the 50 lowest salary requests.  
In other words, after collecting all 100 "salary requests" from its employees, Firm A will lay off the 50 employees who 
submitted the 50 highest salary requests. 
Each of the 50 employees laid off will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
The remaining 50 employees will work at Firm A.  
All employees retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the salary they requested. 
These retained employees will be paid the lowest salary that was requested among the 50 employees laid off  
In other words, Firm A will pay all retained employees the 50th highest salary requested.  
Note that this salary will be as high or higher than the salary requested by any of the 50 retained employees. 
 
Your Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
"Remember that if your request is among the highest 50 of the 100 salary requests submitted, you will be laid off from 
Firm A and will work for Firm B. 
If your salary request to Firm A is among the 50 lowest requests, you will continue to work for Firm A and will receive an 
annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested among the 50 employees not retained.  
 
Recall that Firm B is offering you: $ 
 
What annual salary do you request from Firm A: 
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
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You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your Salary Request Above.  
a. Retained by Firm A 
Results 
Your salary request was among the 50 lowest requested, and you will therefore be retained by Firm A. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $ 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was: $ 
The 50th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was: $ 
Your annual salary request to Firm A was:      $ 
 
Your Employer and Salary 
Since your salary request was among the 50 lowest requests submitted to Firm A, you will be retained by Firm A. 
Your salary will be equal to the 50th highest salary request submitted to Firm A as given above. 
Thus, your salary will be: $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
 $150,000 of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings. 
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You. 
 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Results 
Your salary request was among the 50 highest requested, and you will therefore not be retained by Firm A.  
You will now be employed by Firm B. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $ 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $ 
The 50th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:  $ 
Your annual salary request to Firm A was:       $ 
 
Your Employer and Salary  
Since your salary request was among the 50 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
You will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B. 
Your salary will be equal to the offer provided by Firm B.  
Thus, your salary will be: $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
2. Independent NMI Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A.  
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B.  
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you.  
Your only goal is to maximize the total value of your annual compensation.  
Your compensation may now include both monetary and non-monetary incentives. 
 
Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) 
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A non-monetary incentive (NMI) is any benefit provided to an employee other than cash compensation.  
Examples of NMIs include such benefits as: 
-- Housing or education assistance, 
-- Flexible work arrangements, and 
-- Choice of a particular office, location, or position  
Firm A is offering two potential non-monetary incentives which will be generically labeled NMI 1 and NMI 2.  
In addition to his/her salary, each employee retained by Firm A will receive either: 
  (a) NMI 1 only. 
  (b) NMI 2 only. 
  (c) Both NMI 1 and NMI 2, or  
  (d) Neither NMI 1 nor NMI 2.  
In fact, each employee retained by Firm A will choose which NMI or NMIs he/she would like to receive. 
How these choices are made will be described in more detail below.  
 
Your Value for Non-Monetary Incentives 
Your values for each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A (and for both NMIs in combination) are as follows:  
 
   Value 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
These amounts reflect your cash equivalent value for each NMI as well as the combination of both NMIs.  
In other words, each NMI has the same value to you as the corresponding cash amount indicated above.  
Put another way, you would rather receive the NMI than any cash amount less than the value indicated.  
Conversely, you would rather receive any cash amount greater than the indicated value than receive the NMI.  
Also, note that your value for both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
With the possibility of receiving NMIs, the total value of your annual compensation will now be the sum of:  
  (1) Your annual salary amount, plus 
  (2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you receive 
Recall that your actual cash earnings from this experiment are determined by this total value of your annual  
compensation, not by your salary alone.  
Please also note that your NMI values will change in each round of the experiment. 
 
The Distribution of NMI Values 
Different employees value each NMI differently.  
Some employees will value an NMI very highly while others will assign very little value to the very same NMI.  
For each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A, employee valuations range between $0 and $25,000.  
Moreover, the employee values for each NMI are spread evenly over this range.  
Thus, you know that any other employee could value a particular NMI as little as $0 or as much as $25,000, with each 
value between those extremes being equally likely. 
 
The Cost of Non-Monetary Incentives  
Firm A must incur some cost to provide either NMI (or both NMIs) to one of its employees.  
Firm A's cost of providing each of the two NMIs (or both NMIs in combination) is as follows:  
 
   Cost 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
Note that Firm A's cost to provide both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI costs. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately.  
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately.  
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off.  
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B.  
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
Compensation at Firm B will consist of this monetary incentive alone.  
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Firm B employees will not receive any non-monetary incentives. 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound.  
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Determining Which Employees to Retain at Firm A 
Firm A will determine which 50 employees to retain -- and how each retained employee will be compensated using a 
survey regarding requested compensation. 
This compensation survey will now consist of two parts 
(1) An NMI survey in which each employee identifies which NMIs he/she wants to receive if retained; and  
(2) A salary survey in which each employee specifies the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to  receive 
in order to remain with Firm A assuming that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested. 
Firm A will calculate the total cost of each employee's compensation request as the sum of:  
(1) The cost of any NMIs or combination of NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey, plus  
(2) The annual salary amount he/she requested in the salary survey.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 lowest-cost compensation requests will be retained by Firm A.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 highest-cost compensation requests will be laid off.  
Each of the laid off employees will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
 
Determining Compensation for Employees at Firm A 
Note that the 50 employees retained by Firm A will likely receive different compensation packages, because they will have 
presumably requested different NMIs in the NMI survey. 
Nonetheless, the compensation package (salary plus NMIs) received by each retained employee will have the  same 
total cost to Firm A, regardless of the NMIs or salary requested. 
In particular, each retained employee will receive a compensation package whose total cost is equal to the cost  of the 
lowest-cost compensation request among the 50 laid-off employees.  
In other words, each retained employee will receive a compensation package whose total cost is equal to the cost  
of the 50th highest-cost compensation request.  
To illustrate, let us refer to the cost of this 50th highest-cost compensation request as the "cutoff cost."  
Note that each of the 50 retained employees will have submitted a compensation request whose total cost  was 
below this cutoff cost. 
Recall that each retained employee will receive whichever NMI or NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey.  
The salary for each employee retained by Firm A will then be determined as follows: 
 
NMI(s) Received  Salary Received 
None   Cutoff Cost 
NMI 1   Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 
NMI 2   Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 2 
NMI 1 & NMI 2  Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 - Cost of NMI 2 
 
Thus, each Firm A employee receives a salary equal to the cutoff cost minus the total cost of NMIs received.  
Note that, while salaries may vary, the total compensation cost for all Firm A employees will be the same. 
Also note that the salary received by each Firm A employee does not depend upon either:  
(1) the actual salary amount he/she requested, nor  
(2) his or her value for either or both of the NMIs.  
 
NMI Survey at Firm A 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered is as follows:  
 
  Value  Cost 
NMI 1  $  $ 
NMI 2   $  $ 
Both NMIs $  $ 
 
Please now select which, if any, of the two NMIs you would like to receive if retained by Firm A.  
In doing so, please recall that:  
(1) If you are retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMI chosen,  
(2) The total value of your compensation at Firm A increases by the value of each NMI (or combination) chosen, 
(3) The cost of each NMI chosen will be added to your salary request when determining whether you will be  retained 
by Firm A (i.e., whether your compensation request is among the 50 lowest-cost requests), and  
(4) In exchange for each NMI chosen, the cost of that NMI will be subtracted from your salary if retained by Firm A.  






The total value and cost associated with the NMI selections above is:  
 
Total NMI value for you:  $ 
Total NMI cost for Firm A:  $ 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
Firm A is further asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in 
order to remain with Firm A, given that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested if retained.  
Recall that Firm B is offering you:  $ 
Thus, knowing Firm B's offer & that you will receive the NMIs selected above (& the associated total NMI value)  if you 
remain with Firm A, what annual salary do you request from Firm A in addition to the NMI(s) chosen?  
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
 
Total Value and Cost of Your Compensation Request 
 
Given your NMI and salary requests above, note that the total value and cost of your combined requests are:  
 
Total value (to you) of your compensation request : $ 
Total cost (to Firm A) of your compensation request: $ 
 
You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your NMI and Salary Requests Above. 
a. Retained by Firm A 
Results 
The total cost of your compensation request was among the 50 lowest-cost requests submitted to Firm A.  
In other words, the total cost of your compensation request was below the "cutoff cost" among all requests.  
Therefore, you will be retained by Firm A. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The highest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The 50th highest ("cutoff") cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its employees was:   $ 
The total cost of the compensation request you submitted to Firm A was:      $ 
 
Your Non-Monetary Incentives 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered was as follows: 
 
  Value Cost 
NMI 1  $ $ 
NMI 2  $ $ 
Both NMIs $ $ 
 
Because you are to be retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMIs you requested in the compensation survey.  
Thus, the NMIs included as part of your compensation at Firm A will be as follows: 
 
 Received? 
NMI 1 YES/NO 
NMI 2 YES/NO 
 
The total value and cost associated with the NMIs you will receive are as follows:  
 
Total NMI value for you: $ 
Total NMI cost for Firm A: $ 
 
Your Salary 
Recall that each Firm A employee receives a salary equal to the cutoff cost minus the total cost of NMIs received.  
Thus, your salary is determined as follows: 
 
Cutoff cost (i.e., 50th highest cost compensation request):  $ 
Total cost of NMIs you will receive:    $ 
Your annual salary at Firm A:     $ 
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Total Value of Your Annual Compensation 
The total value of your annual compensation is therefore given by:  
 
Annual salary:   $ 
Total NMI value:   $ 
Total compensation value:  $ 
 
The total compensation value above is your experimental earnings for this round.  
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Results 
The total cost of your compensation request was among the 50 highest-cost requests submitted to Firm A.  
In other words, the total cost of your compensation request was above the "cutoff cost" among all requests.  
Therefore, you will not be retained by Firm A and will now be employed by Firm B. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The highest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The 50th highest ("cutoff") cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its employees was:   $ 
The total cost of the compensation request you submitted to Firm A was:      $ 
 
Your Salary 
As indicated, you will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B.  
Because Firm B does not offer NMIs, the total value of your compensation will be reflected in your annual salary.  
Your salary will be equal to the amount previously offered to you by Firm B.  
Thus, your salary will be:  $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
 
3. Combinatorial NMI Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A.  
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B.  
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you.  
Your only goal is to maximize the total value of your annual compensation.  
Your compensation may now include both monetary and non-monetary incentives. 
 
Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) 
A non-monetary incentive (NMI) is any benefit provided to an employee other than cash compensation.  
Examples of NMIs include such benefits as: 
-- Housing or education assistance, 
-- Flexible work arrangements, and 
-- Choice of a particular office, location, or position  
Firm A is offering two potential non-monetary incentives which will be generically labeled NMI 1 and NMI 2.  
In addition to his/her salary, each employee retained by Firm A will receive either: 
  (a) NMI 1 only. 
  (b) NMI 2 only. 
  (c) Both NMI 1 and NMI 2, or  
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  (d) Neither NMI 1 nor NMI 2.  
In fact, each employee retained by Firm A will choose which NMI or NMIs he/she would like to receive. 
How these choices are made will be described in more detail below.  
 
Your Value for Non-Monetary Incentives 
Your values for each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A (and for both NMIs in combination) are as follows:  
 
   Value 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
These amounts reflect your cash equivalent value for each NMI as well as the combination of both NMIs.  
In other words, each NMI has the same value to you as the corresponding cash amount indicated above.  
Put another way, you would rather receive the NMI than any cash amount less than the value indicated.  
Conversely, you would rather receive any cash amount greater than the indicated value than receive the NMI.  
Also, note that your value for both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
With the possibility of receiving NMIs, the total value of your annual compensation will now be the sum of:  
(1) Your annual salary amount, plus 
(2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you receive. 
Recall that your actual cash earnings from this experiment are determined by this total value of your annual 
compensation, not by your salary alone.  
Please also note that your NMI values will change in each round of the experiment. 
 
The Value of NMIs in Combination 
The value to you from receiving both NMIs will now often not be equal to the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
Sometimes, the value of the combination may be greater than the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
At other times, the value of the combination may be less than the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
In either case, the value of the combination may influence which NMI or NMIs (if any) you want to choose.  
 
The Distribution of NMI Values 
Different employees value each NMI differently.  
Some employees will value an NMI very highly while others will assign very little value to the very same NMI.  
For each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A, employee valuations range between $0 and $25,000.  
Moreover, the employee values for each NMI are spread evenly over this range.  
Thus, you know that any other employee could value a particular NMI as little as $0 or as much as $25,000, with each 
value between those extremes being equally likely. 
 
The Cost of Non-Monetary Incentives  
Firm A must incur some cost to provide either NMI (or both NMIs) to one of its employees.  
Firm A's cost of providing each of the two NMIs (or both NMIs in combination) is as follows:  
 
   Cost 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
Note that Firm A's cost to provide both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI costs. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately.  
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately.  
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off.  
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B.  
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
Compensation at Firm B will consist of this monetary incentive alone.  
Firm B employees will not receive any non-monetary incentives. 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
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You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound.  
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Determining Which Employees to Retain at Firm A 
Firm A will determine which 50 employees to retain -- and how each retained employee will be compensated using a 
survey regarding requested compensation. 
This compensation survey will now consist of two parts 
(1) An NMI survey in which each employee identifies which NMIs he/she wants to receive if retained; and  
(2) A salary survey in which each employee specifies the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to  receive 
in order to remain with Firm A assuming that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested. 
Firm A will calculate the total cost of each employee's compensation request as the sum of:  
(1) The cost of any NMIs or combination of NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey, plus  
(2) The annual salary amount he/she requested in the salary survey.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 lowest-cost compensation requests will be retained by Firm A.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 highest-cost compensation requests will be laid off.  
Each of the laid off employees will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
 
Determining Compensation for Employees at Firm A 
Note that the 50 employees retained by Firm A will likely receive different compensation packages, because they will have 
presumably requested different NMIs in the NMI survey. 
Nonetheless, the compensation package (salary plus NMIs) received by each retained employee will have the  same 
total cost to Firm A, regardless of the NMIs or salary requested. 
In particular, each retained employee will receive a compensation package whose total cost is equal to the cost  of the 
lowest-cost compensation request among the 50 laid-off employees.  
In other words, each retained employee will receive a compensation package whose total cost is equal to the cost  
of the 50th highest-cost compensation request.  
To illustrate, let us refer to the cost of this 50th highest-cost compensation request as the "cutoff cost."  
Note that each of the 50 retained employees will have submitted a compensation request whose total cost  was 
below this cutoff cost. 
Recall that each retained employee will receive whichever NMI or NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey.  
The salary for each employee retained by Firm A will then be determined as follows: 
 
NMI(s) Received  Salary Received 
None   Cutoff Cost 
NMI 1   Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 
NMI 2   Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 2 
NMI 1 & NMI 2  Cutoff Cost - Cost of NMI 1 - Cost of NMI 2 
 
Thus, each Firm A employee receives a salary equal to the cutoff cost minus the total cost of NMIs received.  
Note that, while salaries may vary, the total compensation cost for all Firm A employees will be the same. 
Also note that the salary received by each Firm A employee does not depend upon either:  
(1) the actual salary amount he/she requested, nor  
(2) his or her value for either or both of the NMIs.  
 
NMI Survey at Firm A 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered is as follows:  
 
  Value  Cost 
NMI 1  $  $ 
NMI 2   $  $ 
Both NMIs $  $ 
 
Please now select which, if any, of the two NMIs you would like to receive if retained by Firm A.  
In doing so, please recall that:  
(1) If you are retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMI chosen,  
(2) The total value of your compensation at Firm A increases by the value of each NMI (or combination) chosen, 
(3) The cost of each NMI chosen will be added to your salary request when determining whether you will be  retained 
by Firm A (i.e., whether your compensation request is among the 50 lowest-cost requests), and  
(4) In exchange for each NMI chosen, the cost of that NMI will be subtracted from your salary if retained by Firm A.  
 






The total value and cost associated with the NMI selections above is:  
 
Total NMI value for you:  $ 
Total NMI cost for Firm A:  $ 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
Firm A is further asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in 
order to remain with Firm A, given that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested if retained.  
Recall that Firm B is offering you:  $ 
Thus, knowing Firm B's offer & that you will receive the NMIs selected above (& the associated total NMI value)  if you 
remain with Firm A, what annual salary do you request from Firm A in addition to the NMI(s) chosen?  
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
 
Total Value and Cost of Your Compensation Request 
 
Given your NMI and salary requests above, note that the total value and cost of your combined requests are:  
 
Total value (to you) of your compensation request : $ 
Total cost (to Firm A) of your compensation request: $ 
 
You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your NMI and Salary Requests Above. 
 
a. Retained by Firm A 
Same as Uniform Independent “Retained by Firm A” 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Same as Uniform Independent “Not retained by Firm 
A” 
B. DISCRIMINATORY 
1. Cash Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A.  
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B.  
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you.  
Your only goal is to maximize the total value of your annual compensation.  
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately.  
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ the 50 employees who are laid off by Firm A. 
If you are laid off from Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately. 
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B. 
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
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You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound.  
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will have no influence on his/her future salary at Firm A.  
Instead, the annual salary that Firm A will pay to each of its retained employees will be determined using a survey.  
The survey asks each Firm A employee to indicate the annual salary amount he/she requires to remain with Firm A.  
Firm A will then retain the 50 of its 100 employees who submitted the 50 lowest salary requests.  
In other words, after collecting all 100 salary requests from its employees, Firm A will lay off the 50 employees  who 
submitted the 50 highest salary requests. 
Each of the 50 employees laid off will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
The remaining 50 employees will work at Firm A (they do not have the option at that point to work for Firm B).  
Each employee retained by Firm A will be paid whatever annual salary amount he/she requested in the salary survey. 
Thus, different Firm A employees will receive different annual salaries, matching their salary survey responses.  
 
Your Salary Request to Firm A 
You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the 50 highest salary requests submitted, you will be laid off  from Firm A and 
will work for Firm B. 
If your salary request to Firm A is among the 50 lowest requests, you will continue to work for Firm A  and will receive 
whatever annual salary you requested in the salary survey.  
 
Recall that Firm B is offering you:  $ 
 
What annual salary do you request from Firm A:  
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
 
You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your Salary Request Above.  
 
a. Retained by Firm A 
Results 
Your salary request was among the 50 lowest requested, and you will therefore be retained by Firm A. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:   $ 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:  $ 
The 50th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:  $ 
Your annual salary request to Firm A was:       $ 
 
Your Employer and Salary  
Since your salary request was among the 50 lowest requests submitted to Firm A, you will be retained by Firm A.  
Your salary will be equal to the annual salary amount you requested in the salary survey.  
Thus, your salary will be:  $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Results 
Your salary request was among the 50 highest requested, and you will therefore not be retained by Firm A.  
You will now be employed by Firm B. 
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Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $ 
The highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:  $ 
The 50th highest annual salary request submitted to Firm A by one of its current employees was:  $ 
Your annual salary request to Firm A was:       $ 
 
Your Employer and Salary  
Since your salary request was among the 50 highest requests submitted to Firm A. 
You will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B. 
Your salary will be equal to the offer provided by Firm B.  
Thus, your salary will be: $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
 
2. Independent NMI Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A.  
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B.  
You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you.  
Your only goal is to maximize the total value of your annual compensation.  
Your compensation may now include both monetary and non-monetary incentives. 
 
Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) 
A non-monetary incentive (NMI) is any benefit provided to an employee other than cash compensation.  
Examples of NMIs include such benefits as: 
-- Housing or education assistance, 
-- Flexible work arrangements, and 
-- Choice of a particular office, location, or position  
Firm A is offering two potential non-monetary incentives which will be generically labeled NMI 1 and NMI 2.  
In addition to his/her salary, each employee retained by Firm A will receive either: 
  (a) NMI 1 only. 
  (b) NMI 2 only. 
  (c) Both NMI 1 and NMI 2, or  
  (d) Neither NMI 1 nor NMI 2.  
In fact, each employee retained by Firm A will choose which NMI or NMIs he/she would like to receive. 
How these choices are made will be described in more detail below.  
 
Your Value for Non-Monetary Incentives 
Your values for each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A (and for both NMIs in combination) are as follows:  
 
   Value 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
These amounts reflect your cash equivalent value for each NMI as well as the combination of both NMIs.  
In other words, each NMI has the same value to you as the corresponding cash amount indicated above.  
Put another way, you would rather receive the NMI than any cash amount less than the value indicated.  
Conversely, you would rather receive any cash amount greater than the indicated value than receive the NMI.  
Also, note that your value for both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
With the possibility of receiving NMIs, the total value of your annual compensation will now be the sum of:  
  (1) Your annual salary amount, plus 
  (2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you receive 
Recall that your actual cash earnings from this experiment are determined by this total value of your annual  
compensation, not by your salary alone.  
Please also note that your NMI values will change in each round of the experiment. 
 
The Distribution of NMI Values 
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Different employees value each NMI differently.  
Some employees will value an NMI very highly while others will assign very little value to the very same NMI.  
For each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A, employee valuations range between $0 and $25,000.  
Moreover, the employee values for each NMI are spread evenly over this range.  
Thus, you know that any other employee could value a particular NMI as little as $0 or as much as $25,000, with each 
value between those extremes being equally likely. 
 
The Cost of Non-Monetary Incentives  
Firm A must incur some cost to provide either NMI (or both NMIs) to one of its employees.  
Firm A's cost of providing each of the two NMIs (or both NMIs in combination) is as follows:  
 
   Cost 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
Note that Firm A's cost to provide both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI costs. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately.  
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 
Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately.  
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off.  
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B.  
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
Compensation at Firm B will consist of this monetary incentive alone.  
Firm B employees will not receive any non-monetary incentives. 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound.  
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Determining Which Employees to Retain at Firm A 
Firm A will determine which 50 employees to retain -- and how each retained employee will be compensated using a 
survey regarding requested compensation. 
This compensation survey will now consist of two parts 
(1) An NMI survey in which each employee identifies which NMIs he/she wants to receive if retained; and  
(2) A salary survey in which each employee specifies the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to  receive 
in order to remain with Firm A assuming that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested. 
Firm A will calculate the total cost of each employee's compensation request as the sum of:  
(1) The cost of any NMIs or combination of NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey, plus  
(2) The annual salary amount he/she requested in the salary survey.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 lowest-cost compensation requests will be retained by Firm A.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 highest-cost compensation requests will be laid off.  
Each of the laid off employees will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
 
Determining Compensation for Employees at Firm A 
 
Note that the 50 employees retained by Firm A will likely receive different compensation packages, because they will have 
presumably requested different NMIs in the NMI survey and different salaries in the salary survey. 
Each employee retained by Firm A will receive whichever NMI or NMIs he she requested, his/her value for these NMIs will 
be added to the total value of his/her overall compensation. 
Each employee retained by Firm A will also receive whatever salary amount he/she requested. 
Thus, if you are retained by Firm A, the total value of your annual compensation will be the sum of: 
(1) Whatever annual salary amount your requested in the salary survey, plus 
(2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you requested in the NMI survey. 
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NMI Survey at Firm A 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered is as follows:  
 
  Value  Cost 
NMI 1  $  $ 
NMI 2   $  $ 
Both NMIs $  $ 
 
Please now select which, if any, of the two NMIs you would like to receive if retained by Firm A.  
In doing so, please recall that:  
(1) If you are retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMI chosen,  
(2) The total value of your compensation at Firm A increases by the value of each NMI (or combination) chosen, 
(3) The cost of each NMI chosen will be added to your salary request when determining whether you will be  retained 
by Firm A (i.e., whether your compensation request is among the 50 lowest-cost requests), and  
(4) In exchange for each NMI chosen, the cost of that NMI will be subtracted from your salary if retained by Firm A.  





The total value and cost associated with the NMI selections above is:  
 
Total NMI value for you:  $ 
Total NMI cost for Firm A:  $ 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
Firm A is further asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in 
order to remain with Firm A, given that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested if retained.  
Recall that Firm B is offering you:  $ 
Thus, knowing Firm B's offer & that you will receive the NMIs selected above (& the associated total NMI value)  if you 
remain with Firm A, what annual salary do you request from Firm A in addition to the NMI(s) chosen?  
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
 
Total Value and Cost of Your Compensation Request 
 
Given your NMI and salary requests above, note that the total value and cost of your combined requests are:  
 
Total value (to you) of your compensation request : $ 
Total cost (to Firm A) of your compensation request: $ 
 
You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your NMI and Salary Requests Above. 
 
a. Retained by Firm A 
Results 
The total cost of your compensation request was among the 50 lowest-cost requests submitted to Firm A.  
In other words, the total cost of your compensation request was below the "cutoff cost" among all requests.  
Therefore, you will be retained by Firm A. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The highest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The 50th highest ("cutoff") cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its employees was:   $ 
The total cost of the compensation request you submitted to Firm A was:      $ 
 
Your Non-Monetary Incentives 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered was as follows: 
 
  Value Cost 
NMI 1  $ $ 
NMI 2  $ $ 
Both NMIs $ $ 
 
Because you are to be retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMIs you requested in the compensation survey.  
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Thus, the NMIs included as part of your compensation at Firm A will be as follows: 
 
 Received? 
NMI 1 YES/NO 
NMI 2 YES/NO 
 
The total value and cost associated with the NMIs you will receive are as follows:  
 
Total NMI value for you: $ 




Recall that each employee retained by Firm A  receives whatever salary he/she requested in the salary survey.  
Thus, your annual salary will be: $ 
 
Total Value of Your Annual Compensation 
The total value of your annual compensation is therefore given by:  
 
Annual salary:   $ 
Total NMI value:   $ 
Total compensation value:  $ 
 
The total compensation value above is your experimental earnings for this round.  
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You. 
 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Results 
The total cost of your compensation request was among the 50 highest-cost requests submitted to Firm A.  
In other words, the total cost of your compensation request was above the "cutoff cost" among all requests.  
Therefore, you will not be retained by Firm A and will now be employed by Firm B. 
 
Distribution of Salary Requests to Firm A 
The lowest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The highest cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its other current employees was:   $ 
The 50th highest ("cutoff") cost of all compensation requests submitted to Firm A by one of its employees was:   $ 
The total cost of the compensation request you submitted to Firm A was:      $ 
 
Your Salary 
As indicated, you will not be retained by Firm A and will instead be employed by Firm B.  
Because Firm B does not offer NMIs, the total value of your compensation will be reflected in your annual salary.  
Your salary will be equal to the amount previously offered to you by Firm B.  
Thus, your salary will be:  $ 
 
The salary above is your experimental earnings for this round. 
This total of all the rounds will be converted to actual earnings from participation in this experiment at the exchange rate of 
$150,000  of experimental income = $1 of actual earnings.  
 
Please wait until instructed to do so before clicking on the button below. 
 
Please Do Not Click Button Until Instructed to Do So.  Thank You.  
 
3. Combinatorial NMI Bid 
Scenario Background 
You are 1 of 100 employees currently working for Firm A.  
Your only other potential employer is Firm B. 
You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm B.  
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You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you.  
Your only goal is to maximize the total value of your annual compensation.  
Your compensation may now include both monetary and non-monetary incentives. 
 
Non-Monetary Incentives (NMIs) 
A non-monetary incentive (NMI) is any benefit provided to an employee other than cash compensation.  
Examples of NMIs include such benefits as: 
-- Housing or education assistance, 
-- Flexible work arrangements, and 
-- Choice of a particular office, location, or position  
Firm A is offering two potential non-monetary incentives which will be generically labeled NMI 1 and NMI 2.  
In addition to his/her salary, each employee retained by Firm A will receive either: 
  (a) NMI 1 only. 
  (b) NMI 2 only. 
  (c) Both NMI 1 and NMI 2, or  
  (d) Neither NMI 1 nor NMI 2.  
In fact, each employee retained by Firm A will choose which NMI or NMIs he/she would like to receive. 
How these choices are made will be described in more detail below.  
 
Your Value for Non-Monetary Incentives 
Your values for each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A (and for both NMIs in combination) are as follows:  
 
   Value 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
These amounts reflect your cash equivalent value for each NMI as well as the combination of both NMIs.  
In other words, each NMI has the same value to you as the corresponding cash amount indicated above.  
Put another way, you would rather receive the NMI than any cash amount less than the value indicated.  
Conversely, you would rather receive any cash amount greater than the indicated value than receive the NMI.  
Also, note that your value for both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
With the possibility of receiving NMIs, the total value of your annual compensation will now be the sum of:  
(1) Your annual salary amount, plus 
(2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you receive. 
Recall that your actual cash earnings from this experiment are determined by this total value of your annual 
compensation, not by your salary alone.  
Please also note that your NMI values will change in each round of the experiment. 
 
The Value of NMIs in Combination 
The value to you from receiving both NMIs will now often not be equal to the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
Sometimes, the value of the combination may be greater than the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
At other times, the value of the combination may be less than the sum of the two individual NMI values.  
In either case, the value of the combination may influence which NMI or NMIs (if any) you want to choose.  
 
The Distribution of NMI Values 
Different employees value each NMI differently.  
Some employees will value an NMI very highly while others will assign very little value to the very same NMI.  
For each of the two NMIs offered by Firm A, employee valuations range between $0 and $25,000.  
Moreover, the employee values for each NMI are spread evenly over this range.  
Thus, you know that any other employee could value a particular NMI as little as $0 or as much as $25,000, with each 
value between those extremes being equally likely. 
 
The Cost of Non-Monetary Incentives  
Firm A must incur some cost to provide either NMI (or both NMIs) to one of its employees.  
Firm A's cost of providing each of the two NMIs (or both NMIs in combination) is as follows:  
 
   Cost 
NMI 1 only  $ 
NMI 2 only  $ 
Both NMI 1 and NMI 2 $ 
 
Note that Firm A's cost to provide both NMIs together is simply the sum of the two individual NMI costs. 
 
Downsizing at Firm A 
Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be laid off immediately.  
After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
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Employment Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A.  
If you leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately.  
This standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave Firm A voluntarily or are laid off.  
 
Salary Offer from Firm B 
Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each employee currently working for Firm A. 
The offer presented to each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive if employed by Firm B.  
Firm B has offered different annual salary amounts to different Firm A employees. 
Firm B has offered to pay you the following annual salary:  $ 
Compensation at Firm B will consist of this monetary incentive alone.  
Firm B employees will not receive any non-monetary incentives. 
 
Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to other current employees at Firm A.  
You know only that all of Firm B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some lower bound & some upper bound.  
You do not know the actual lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers.  
However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B lies somewhere within this range of offers.  
Thus, it likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher than your offer above.  
It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are lower than your offer.  
 
Determining Which Employees to Retain at Firm A 
Firm A will determine which 50 employees to retain -- and how each retained employee will be compensated using a 
survey regarding requested compensation. 
This compensation survey will now consist of two parts 
(1) An NMI survey in which each employee identifies which NMIs he/she wants to receive if retained; and  
(2) A salary survey in which each employee specifies the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to  receive 
in order to remain with Firm A assuming that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested. 
Firm A will calculate the total cost of each employee's compensation request as the sum of:  
(1) The cost of any NMIs or combination of NMIs he/she requested in the NMI survey, plus  
(2) The annual salary amount he/she requested in the salary survey.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 lowest-cost compensation requests will be retained by Firm A.  
The 50 employees who submit the 50 highest-cost compensation requests will be laid off.  
Each of the laid off employees will immediately begin working at Firm B at the salary previously offered.  
 
Determining Compensation for Employees at Firm A 
 
Note that the 50 employees retained by Firm A will likely receive different compensation packages, because they will have 
presumably requested different NMIs in the NMI survey and different salaries in the salary survey. 
Each employee retained by Firm A will receive whichever NMI or NMIs he she requested, his/her value for these NMIs will 
be added to the total value of his/her overall compensation. 
Each employee retained by Firm A will also receive whatever salary amount he/she requested. 
Thus, if you are retained by Firm A, the total value of your annual compensation will be the sum of: 
(1) Whatever annual salary amount your requested in the salary survey, plus 
(2) Your value for any NMIs or combination of NMIs you requested in the NMI survey. 
 
 
NMI Survey at Firm A 
Recall that the value (to you) and the cost (to Firm A) associated with the NMIs offered is as follows:  
 
  Value  Cost 
NMI 1  $  $ 
NMI 2   $  $ 
Both NMIs $  $ 
 
Please now select which, if any, of the two NMIs you would like to receive if retained by Firm A.  
In doing so, please recall that:  
(1) If you are retained by Firm A, you will receive any NMI chosen,  
(2) The total value of your compensation at Firm A increases by the value of each NMI (or combination) chosen, 
(3) The cost of each NMI chosen will be added to your salary request when determining whether you will be  retained 
by Firm A (i.e., whether your compensation request is among the 50 lowest-cost requests), and  
(4) In exchange for each NMI chosen, the cost of that NMI will be subtracted from your salary if retained by Firm A.  
 






The total value and cost associated with the NMI selections above is:  
 
Total NMI value for you:  $ 
Total NMI cost for Firm A:  $ 
 
Salary Survey at Firm A 
Firm A is further asking each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that he/she would need to receive in 
order to remain with Firm A, given that he/she would also receive the NMI(s) requested if retained.  
Recall that Firm B is offering you:  $ 
Thus, knowing Firm B's offer & that you will receive the NMIs selected above (& the associated total NMI value)  if you 
remain with Firm A, what annual salary do you request from Firm A in addition to the NMI(s) chosen?  
 
Salary Request to Firm A: 
 
Total Value and Cost of Your Compensation Request 
 
Given your NMI and salary requests above, note that the total value and cost of your combined requests are:  
 
Total value (to you) of your compensation request : $ 
Total cost (to Firm A) of your compensation request: $ 
 
You May Click Button Whenever You Are Satisfied With Your NMI and Salary Requests Above. 
 
a. Retained by Firm A 
Same as Discriminatory Independent “Retained by 
Firm A” 
b. Not Retained by Firm A 
Same as Discriminatory Independent “Not retained 
by Firm A” 
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APPENDIX E.  EXPERIMENT NOTES 
Experiment After-Action Notes: 
 
4 February 2010, 1300 
Experimenters – Peter Coughlan, Noah Myung, Kyle Hahn, 
Marlow Levy 
‐ Started on time. 
‐ Used 17 of 18 computers in computer lab (In-224), 
computer #15 was not working. 
‐ Uniform (second-price) auction session. 
‐ Depicted cutoff costs on results page did not include 
NMIs cost.  Corrected after experiment.  Analysis will 
determine if it affected results. 
 
5 February 2010, 1200 
Experimenters - Peter Coughlan, Kyle Hahn, Marlow Levy 
‐ Started on time. 
‐ Used 17 of 18 computers in computer lab (In-224), 
computer #15 was not working. 
‐ Discriminatory (first-price) auction session. 
‐ Practice Survey A had a random green highlighted line. 
‐ Interdependent NMIs (rounds 11-20), Salary Request 
Cost was not calculating correctly.  Had volunteers 
leave the room for 10 minutes to correct the problem. 
‐ Upon correcting the Salary Request Cost calculation, 
ghost images with numbers started to appear on the 
screen.  Unprotected the workbooks to try and make 
images go away, it did not work.  Other than being an 
inconvenience, it is unknown if the random ghost 
images gave volunteers an advantage or not.  
Experimenters watched volunteers to see if anyone was 
trying to incorporate ghost images in their 
calculation or use the visible tabs to their 
advantage, no volunteer appeared to be. 
‐ Last five monetary (rounds 26-30), were supposed to be 
set up for discriminatory but were calculating for 
uniform. 
‐ Volunteer (#7) had to leave at 1330. 
‐ Volunteer (#14) had to leave at 1345 for family issues 




5 February 2010, 1500 
Experimenters - Peter Coughlan, Kyle Hahn, Marlow Levy 
‐ Started on time. 
‐ Used 17 of 18 computers in computer lab (In-224), 
computer #15 was not working. 
‐ Discriminatory (first-price) auction session. 
‐ Last five monetary (rounds 26-30), were incorrectly 
linked and did not show winning bid, only if you were 
retained or not.  However, the data was still recorded 
correctly and would have not affected results. 
‐ Volunteer (#9) closed the computer without saving, 










APPENDIX F.  SUPPORTING DATA 
Actual Bid Value  Actual Bid Value  Actual Bid Value  Actual Bid Value 
Uniform Discrim
Mean 104.7% 104.5% 98.6% 99.6% 104.7% 100.0%
σ 21.4% 20.0% 17.3% 17.1% 18.5% 15.8%
Median 101.9% 100.9% 98.0% 98.3% 102.2% 98.8%
Mean 103.9% 103.9% 100.1% 100.1% 103.9% 100.1%
σ 20.0% 20.0% 17.3% 17.3% 20.0% 17.3%
Median 100.0% 100.0% 97.9% 97.9% 100.0% 97.9%
Mean 106.1% 106.7% 98.5% 100.1% 106.3% 100.5%
σ 22.9% 22.0% 18.8% 19.0% 19.0% 16.7%
Median 105.0% 103.0% 98.4% 98.4% 104.0% 99.0%
Mean 104.0% 103.0% 97.1% 98.6% 104.0% 99.4%
σ 21.1% 17.6% 15.6% 14.8% 16.2% 13.2%
Median 101.9% 100.7% 97.4% 99.3% 102.5% 99.6%
Monetary (1‐5) Mean 105.5% 105.5% 101.9% 101.9% 105.5% 101.9%
σ 22.7% 22.7% 19.9% 19.9% 22.7% 19.9%
Additive (6‐10) Mean 111.6% 111.3% 98.8% 100.9% 110.6% 101.2%
σ 20.7% 21.3% 19.3% 20.5% 17.3% 17.9%
Combin (11‐15) Mean 101.1% 101.3% 94.6% 97.4% 102.5% 98.3%
σ 21.7% 19.0% 15.0% 14.5% 18.1% 12.8%
Combin (16‐20) Mean 106.8% 104.7% 99.6% 99.8% 105.4% 100.4%
σ 20.2% 16.0% 15.9% 15.1% 14.0% 13.5%
Additive (21‐25) Mean 100.7% 102.0% 98.1% 99.3% 102.1% 99.8%
σ 23.8% 21.9% 18.4% 17.4% 19.8% 15.4%
Monetary (26‐30) Mean 102.3% 102.3% 98.4% 98.4% 102.3% 98.4%
σ 16.9% 16.9% 14.1% 14.1% 16.9% 14.1%
Complex Choice Mean 103.4% 102.3% 97.0% 97.7% 103.2% 98.3%
σ 25.9% 21.7% 11.3% 10.9% 21.1% 9.9%
Experience Mean 101.0% 100.1% 96.5% 97.9% 101.8% 98.4%










Value Cost Value Cost
Mean 98.6% 99.0% 94.8% 95.1%
σ 4.3% 4.3% 8.9% 8.6%
Median 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Mean 98.8% 98.8% 94.4% 94.4%
σ 4.4% 4.4% 8.9% 8.9%
Median 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Mean 98.4% 99.0% 95.0% 95.3%
σ 4.6% 4.4% 8.8% 8.5%
Median 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Mean 98.5% 99.2% 95.0% 95.5%
σ 4.0% 4.0% 9.0% 8.4%
Median 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Monetary (1‐5) Mean 98.7% 98.7% 94.3% 94.3%
σ 4.8% 4.8% 9.0% 9.0%
Additive (6‐10) Mean 98.0% 98.6% 95.0% 95.2%
σ 5.0% 4.7% 8.9% 8.7%
Combin (11‐15) Mean 98.8% 99.5% 94.5% 95.1%
σ 3.6% 3.7% 9.7% 9.3%
Combin (16‐20) Mean 98.2% 98.8% 95.5% 95.9%
σ 4.3% 4.3% 8.2% 7.4%
Additive (21‐25) Mean 98.8% 99.5% 95.0% 95.3%
σ 4.2% 4.0% 8.7% 8.4%
Monetary (26‐30) Mean 99.0% 99.0% 94.6% 94.6%
σ 4.1% 4.1% 8.8% 8.8%
Complex Choice Mean 97.8% 98.3% 96.4% 96.6%
σ 5.5% 5.3% 7.4% 7.1%
Experience Mean 99.4% 100.1% 94.7% 94.9%













Value Type 1 Type 2 Invol Ret.
Unrealized 
Value
All Rounds 3% 8% 4% 10% 7% 8% 4% 21%
Monetary 4% 7% 4% 9% 8% 9% 3% 22%
NMI Additive 2% 12% 2% 14% 8% 8% 2% 23%
NMI Combinatorial 5% 6% 5% 11% 5% 6% 6% 20%
Monetary (1‐5) 5% 8% 5% 9% 10% 13% 3% 23%
Additive (6‐10) 2% 14% 2% 6% 9% 8% 3% 27%
Combin (11‐15) 4% 6% 5% 11% 4% 4% 8% 23%
Combin (16‐20) 6% 6% 6% 10% 7% 8% 4% 15%
Additive (21‐25) 1% 11% 0% 29% 7% 9% 1% 15%
Monetary (26‐30) 2% 6% 2% 8% 6% 6% 2% 21%
Complex Choice 7% 9% 9% 10% 7% 5% 4% 10%
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